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Abstract
Effective interventions are much needed to reduce stigma against those with mental illness.
Two experimental studies were conducted to examine the effectiveness of value-based
reasoning interventions in reducing mental illness stigma, and the extent to which
relationships between values and social distance are mediated by attitudes and subjective
norms. In study 1, writing about reasons related to values was found ineffective in
influencing responses to a hypothetical person with schizophrenia. In study 2, there was
some evidence suggesting that considering why self-transcendence values are more important
than self-enhancement values led to more positive attitudes towards behaviors reflecting less
social distance toward the person. In both studies, priorities placed on self-transcendence and
self-enhancement values were found related to social distance, and this relationship was
mediated by attitudes towards behaviors. These findings provided the first evidence
regarding the mechanisms by which values influence behavioral intentions in the context of
mental illness stigma.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Those with serious mental illnesses are often perceived by the public as being
incompetent, unpredictable, and dangerous (Corrigan, 2004; Link, Phelan, Bresnahan,
Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999). Such negative beliefs are widely held, and they seem to
reflect automatic associations with serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and are,
therefore, often described as stereotypes. These stereotypes are associated with negative
evaluations of and, frequently, a preference for greater social distance toward those with
such illness. This in turn results in discriminations such as reduced opportunities with
respect to employment, housing, and health care for those with serious mental illnesses
(Corrigan, 2004). This combination of negative beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral
responses has come to be referred to as the stigma of mental illness (Corrigan, 2004,
2005).
Recognition of such stigma can discourage those with mental illnesses from seeking the
treatment that they need, which could lead to further exacerbation of illness and
deterioration of life circumstances and compromise chances of recovery (Corrigan,
2005). Moreover, when people with mental illnesses internalize these negative
stereotypes and attitudes about individuals with their illness, they develop self-stigma and
suffer from decreased self-esteem, self-efficacy, and well-being (Rüsch, Angermeyer, &
Corrigan, 2005).
Researchers and activists have spent considerable time identifying and advocating against
such stigma. Despite their efforts, mental illness stigma, particularly as related to severe
illnesses such as schizophrenia, has not decreased (Pescosolido et al., 2010; Silton,
Flannelly, Milstein, & Vaaler, 2011). Given the prevalence of stigma and its detrimental
effects on people with mental illness, the development of effective interventions for
improving reactions to those with mental illness has been identified as a priority for
research and public policy (Satcher, 2000). The two types of intervention that have been
used most extensively are educational programs, designed to provide information about
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mental illnesses in order to change negative stereotypes, and contact, which involves inperson or video-based contact with people with mental illnesses (Corrigan, Morris,
Michaels, Rafacz, & Rüsch, 2012; Pinfold et al., 2003). It has been noted that many of
the efforts to reduce the stigma of mental illness have not had a strong empirical or
conceptual justification (Pinto-Foltz & Logsdon, 2009). One goal of the current studies
was to identify a novel intervention to reduce mental illness stigma that was derived from
relevant social psychology theories, and to empirically test its effectiveness.
As noted earlier, mental illness stigma is often described as a sequence of stereotypes,
prejudice, and discrimination towards those with mental illnesses. Research in other
domains of intergroup relations has suggested that prejudice and discrimination do not
always occur, despite people’s exposure to negative stereotypes of a group. Instead,
factors such as motivation to inhibit automatically activated stereotypes and to respond
without prejudice can influence people’s behaviors and self-reported attitudes towards
members of stigmatized groups (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002;
Devine, 1989). Similarly, research on mental illness stigma has found stereotypic beliefs
of people with mental illnesses to predict only a moderate amount of variation in
behavioral intentions towards these people (Norman, Sorrentino, Windell, & Manchanda,
2008).
If stereotypic beliefs of people with mental illness are not the sole contributor to the
stigmatizing attitudes and behaviors towards them, what could be other factors involved
in this process? What could influence a person's attitudes and behaviors towards those
with mental illness, even when he or she is exposed to the prevalent negative stereotypes
of them? One substantial influence on individuals' attitudes and behaviors towards
various targets, including stigmatized groups and their members, is personal values
(Kuntz, Davidov, Schwartz, & Schmidt, 2015; Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2001;
Norman, Sorrentino, Gawronski, et al., 2010; Rokeach, 1971; Schwartz, 1992). The
following section reviews past research on how values, attitudes, and behaviors relate to
one another, how value-related manipulations influence attitudes and behaviors, and how
these findings might have implications for stigma reduction.
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1.1

What Are Values?

Values are abstract beliefs and ideals which are pivotal to one’s self-concept and which
can guide attitudes and behavioral responses across different situations (e.g., Katz, 1960;
Maio et al., 2003; Olson & Zanna, 1993). Rokeach (1968, 1971) suggested that values are
fundamental determinants of attitudes and behaviors, and that while attitudes refer to
groups of beliefs about specific entities, values reflect desirable goals or “end states of
existence” and can have strong motivational properties.
Perhaps one of the most widely utilized contemporary models of personal values is that
developed by Shalom Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz& Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz,
1992; Schwartz et al., 2012). Drawing on previous value theories (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951;
Rokeach, 1973), Schwartz conceptualized values as expressing motivations, particularly
those related to three basic requirements of human existence– needs for surviving as
biological organisms, needs for having coordinated social interactions, and needs for
promoting group welfare and functioning. Based on these three motivations, Schwartz
identified ten specific values, each expressing a distinct motive. These ten specific values
are self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity,
tradition, benevolence, and universalism. Using samples from over 40 countries,
Schwartz and colleagues have mapped out the correlations among endorsement of
different values, and suggested that the values form a circumplex structure (Figure 1).
They postulate that adjacent values are more compatible with each other and those on
opposite sides of the circumplex are usually in conflict. Therefore, people who rate a
value as important will rate its neighboring values as similarly important but those on
opposite side of the structure as relatively unimportant.
Schwartz also proposed that all these values fall on two orthogonal higher-order
dimensions: one dimension contrasts self-enhancement with self-transcendence and the
other opposes conservation to openness to change. The former dimension reflects the
extent to which an individual places importance on pursuing personal success and
dominance over others (self-enhancement) versus acceptance of and concerns for others
(self-transcendence). The second dimension reflects the extent to which an individual
places importance on self-restriction, stability, and traditions (conservation) versus
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having independent thoughts and actions and welcoming changes (openness to change).
The ten values previously described fall along these axes: self-enhancement values are
made up of achievement and power, whereas self-transcendence values are composed of
universalism and benevolence; conservation values are constituted of security,
conformity, and tradition, whereas openness to change values comprise self-direction,
stimulation, and hedonism.

1.2
Values, Attitudes, and Behaviors: the Theory of
Planned Behavior and the Expectancy-Value Model
How do abstract values translate into more concrete expressions in specific attitudes and
behaviors? The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), which accounts for the
relationship between attitudes and behavior, and Norman Feather’s expectancy-value
model (Feather & Newton, 1982; Feather, 1990, 1992), which considers how values
influence behavioral intention through attitudes, could provide some insights into the
underlying structure of the value-attitude-behavior relationship.
The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991) is a widely adopted theory for
explaining the attitude-behavior relationship, and in predicting various behaviors. The
theory postulates that attitudes towards a behavior, subjective norms towards the
behavior, and perception of how much control one has in successfully carrying out the
behavior jointly determine one’s intention to engage in this behavior. Behavioral
intentions, together with perceived behavioral control, in turn determine the actual
behavior. See Figure 2 for an illustration of the theory of planned behavior. The theory of
planned behavior has received much empirical support for its ability to predict various
behaviors, such as cheating on a test, lying, and shoplifting (Beck & Ajzen, 1991),
health-related behaviors (Godin & Kok, 1996), aggression (Finigan-Carr, Cheng, Gielen,
Haynie, & Simons-Morton, 2015), and learning behaviors (Cheon, Lee, Crooks, & Song,
2012). According to this theory, the primary determinants of behavioral intentions and
actual behaviors are attitudes towards the behavior and perceptions of relevant norms.
Norman Feather’s expectancy-value model (Feather & Newton, 1982; Feather, 1990,
1992) suggested that because values are essentially expressing motivations, the
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relationship between values and attitudes and behavioral intentions could be explained by
the expectancy-value theory of motivation (e.g., Atkinson, 1964). The expectancy-value
theory postulated that people’s intention to engage in a specific action depends on (1)
their expectations of whether a specific action would achieve the desired outcome; and
(2) the valences they attach towards the outcome. Feather suggested that the valences that
people attach to potential outcomes would be influenced by personal values: outcomes
consistent with one’s prioritized motives and values would receive positive cognitive and
affective appraisal, and thus be seen as desirable; outcomes that are counter to one’s
prioritized values would be seen as undesirable. Therefore, Feather concluded that values
would influence people’s perceived valences of an outcome, which in combination with
the expectancies to achieve the outcome, would determine their behavioral intentions.
In two studies reported in Feather and Newton (1982), the authors found that people’s
values priorities, measured by the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973), were
systematically related to their attitudes towards two fabricated organizations (i.e., a
“Movement” and a “Campaign”). The “Movement” was described in a pamphlet as
advocating “hard work, responsible citizenship, discipline, respect for authority, defense
of family life”, etc. In comparison, the “Campaign” was described as advocating “defense
of individual liberty, equality, international peace, open minded thought, creative
individual initiative”, etc. It was found that salvation and obedience were positively, and
broadminded and imaginative negatively, related to positive attitudes towards the
“Movement”; freedom, equality, independent, and broadminded were positively related
to positive attitudes towards the “Campaign”. Participants’ attitudes towards the events
could be seen as being determined by the perceived valences attached to the outcome- the
successful launch of these events. Participants’ attitudes towards these two entities then
predicted their willingness to volunteer to help promote the events. Furthermore,
participants’ expectation of how their involvement could actually help the events to be
successful added significantly to the prediction of their willingness to volunteer, over and
above the influence of attitudes towards these two events.
In a more recent study, Feather, Woodyatt, and McKee, (2012) found that people’s
priorities concerning self-enhancement values and self-transcendence values, as
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measured by the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992), predicted their willingness to
carry out supportive actions to a hypothetical organization that putatively strives to repair
social damages done to Indigenous Australians. Using a path analysis, the authors found
that the link between value priority and willingness to support the organization was
mediated by emotions elicited by the issue and the expected outcome of participants’
contribution. This study, together with the two studies by Feather and Newton (1982)
previously described, provides empirical support for Feather’s expectancy-value model in
which values influence behavioral intention through the mediation of attitudes towards
the outcome and expectancies of the outcome.
The theory of planned behavior and Feather’s expectancy-value model could be
combined to provide a more integrated view of how values, attitudes, and behaviors form
hierarchical links. The theory of planned behavior defines attitudes towards a behavior as
being determined by both beliefs about the desirability of the behavioral outcome and
beliefs about the strength of association between the behavior and the outcome (i.e., how
likely the behavior will lead to the outcome) (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Beliefs about the
desirability of the behavioral outcome could be seen as the perceived valences of the
outcome, and the beliefs about the strength of association between the behavior and
outcome could be seen as the expectancies of the outcome. Therefore, determinants of
attitudes towards behaviors, as defined in the theory of planned behavior, would be
consistent with Feather’s value-expectancy model. Through influencing attitudes towards
behaviors, personal values and expectancy of the outcome would exert an impact on
people’s behavioral intentions, which would ultimately determine actual behaviors. In
addition to attitudes towards a behavior, following the theory of planned behavior,
perceived behavioral control should also exert an influence on actual behavior both
directly and indirectly through its influence on behavioral intention. Perceived norms
would also add to the prediction of behavioral intentions in addition to attitudes towards
the behavior and perceived behavioral control. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
There is empirical evidence supporting the hierarchical links among values, attitudes, and
behaviors. Homer and Kahle (1988), for example, found evidence that values influenced
behaviors through their impact on attitudes. Using multivariate and structural equation
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analyses, Homer and Kahle found that people’s values influences their attitudes towards
natural food, which, in turn, led to different shopping behaviors with respect to natural
food. These hierarchical links among values, attitudes, and behaviors have been
repeatedly found in research domains such as environmental behaviors (e.g., Milfont,
Duckitt, & Wagner, 2010) and consumer behaviors (e.g., Cai & Shannon, 2012) across
different cultures. Moreover, some evidence has linked values and attitudes with
behavioral intention (e.g, Kang, Jun, & Arendt, 2015; Vaske & Donneylly, 1999), and
supported the notion that values and subsequent attitudes guide actual behaviors through
exerting impact on behavioral intentions (e.g., Cai & Shannon, 2012). Thus, it seems that
values would influence people’s attitudes towards behaviors, which would influence their
intentions to engage in such behaviors, which would ultimately lead to actual behaviors.

1.3

Values and Stigmatization of Mental Illnesses

Does the value-attitude-behavior link operate in the context of mental illness stigma? Do
values have any influence on attitudinal and behavioral responses to those with serious
mental illness? The self-enhancement versus self-transcendence value dimension is of
particular interest in this context because this dimension is postulated to be particularly
related to people’s goals during social interactions and how they behave when interacting
with others (Schwartz, 2010). During social interactions, a person who prioritizes selfenhancement values would focus mostly on advancing his or her own interests, whereas
someone who prioritizes self-transcendence values would focus more on the welfare of
others. Studies have found self-transcendence values to be positively related to
cooperation in money allocation tasks (Schwartz, 1996), helping behaviors (Daniel,
Bilgin, Brezina, Strohmeier, & Vainre, 2014), willingness to make up for past social
wrongs (Feather, Woodyatt, & McKee, 2012), and environmentally responsible
purchases (Follows & Jobber, 2000). Self-enhancement values, however, were found to
relate negatively to these behaviors.
When value priorities are examined in relation to the stigma of mental illness, studies
have found self-transcendence values related to less stigmatizing attitudes and behaviors
towards people with mental illness and those with drug addictions (Norman, Sorrentino,
Windell, & Manchanda, 2008b; Norman, Sorrentino, Gawronski, et al., 2010; Skinner,
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Feather, Freeman, & Roche, 2007). Self-enhancement values have been found related to
more negative responses towards these groups. The conservation versus openness to
change dimension has generally been found less related or unrelated to stigma of mental
illness: the value of openness to change and the value of conservation were found not
significantly correlated with people’s attitudes or behaviors towards those with mental
illness (Norman et al. 2008b; Norman et al. 2010).
Why would people with high self-enhancement values show more stigmatizing attitudes
and behaviors towards those with mental illnesses than those with high selftranscendence values? People who prioritize self-enhancement values have been found to
only identify with a group when they perceived that group as having high status (e.g.
“prestigious”; “successful”). No such pattern was found for those who prioritize selftranscendence values (Roccas, 2003). These findings confirmed Schwartz’s (1992)
suggestion that people high on self-enhancement, not self-transcendence, values
primarily care about enhancing their own interests during social interactions. People high
on self-enhancement values, thus, might perceive social interacting with those with
serious mental illness as unhelpful or even hindering to furthering their interests such as
social prestige, and therefore display greater social distance towards such people.
Findings with respect to Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) could offer some
additional support to the link between self-enhancement values and stigmatization. SDO
is defined as an individual difference pertaining to general attitudes towards out-groups.
People with high SDO like to see their in-group as being superior to out-groups and
prefer to maintain or even increase social inequality, compared to people low on SDO
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO, therefore, is related to higher
prejudice and discrimination towards out-groups, especially those with low social status
such as people suffering from mental illnesses (Ottati, Bodenhausen, & Newman, 2005).
Power, a sub-value of self-enhancement values, has been found positively related to both
SDO and Modern Racism (Feather & McKee, 2008). The positive correlation between
the value of power and SDO suggests that people with high self-enhancement values
might also favor social inequality and therefore prefer to maintain such social hierarchy
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by avoiding social connections with a low-status out-group such as those with mental
illness.
In contrast to self-enhancement values and SDO, the characteristic of
Egalitarianism/Humanitarianism is universally related to decreased prejudice and
discriminations towards any out-groups (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996), and
it appears similar to the value of universalism as conceptualized in Schwartz’s (1992)
model. Universalism, falling under the self-transcendence domain, expresses the
motivational goal of tolerance and broad-mindedness towards others, even if they are
different or when they are unable to support one's own personal advancement. Selftranscendence values therefore should be negatively related to stigma towards mental
illnesses. In addition to universalism, benevolence, another sub-value of selftranscendence values, could also motivate people to display less stigmatizing attitudes
and behaviors. Benevolence expresses the goal of promoting in-group welfare and
facilitating positive social interactions with other in-group members, which might
motivate people to act in a helpful way towards those in need, especially when those in
need are perceived as one’s in-group members (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005;
Pratto et al., 1994). Therefore, people with high self-transcendence values might perceive
those with mental illnesses as in need of help and show helpful attitudes and behaviors
towards them instead of being rejecting, especially if those with mental illness are
perceived as in-group members.
Although it is evident that self-enhancement values and self-transcendence values are
systematically related to stigmatizing attitudes and behaviors, the value-attitude-behavior
hierarchy as previously described has not been studied in the context of stigmatization of
mental illness. In line with the model delineated in Figure 3, it is expected that the
relation between self-enhancement/transcendence values and stigmatizing behaviors
towards individuals with mental illnesses would be mediated by attitudes towards
behaviors towards those with mental illnesses.
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1.3.1

Perceived Norms: a Potential Mediator of the Value-Stigma
Link

As previously mentioned, subjective norms were identified by the theory of planned
behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991) as a predictor of behaviors in addition to attitudes towards
behaviors. Subjective norms are an individual’s perceived expectations, especially from
those who are important to this person, with regard to engaging in behaviors (Ajzen,
1991). People tend to carry out actions that important others support or approve of, and
refrain from behaving in ways that they perceive as not being supported by normative
expectations.
In describing the composition of the social normative pressure that people perceive,
Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno (1991) suggested that descriptive norms and injunctive
norms are two discriminable, albeit related, social norms. Descriptive norms refer to
perceptions of what other people would likely do in a social situation, whereas injunctive
norms refer to perceptions of whether people would approve or disapprove the relevant
behaviors. Subjective norms, as measured by aggregating subjective injunctive and
descriptive norms, have been found to play an important role in predicting intentions to
engage in different social interactions with people with mental illnesses. For example,
Norman et al. (2008a) found that subjective norms significantly added to the prediction of
behavioral intentions towards people with schizophrenia. The predicted variance in
preferred level of social distance increased from 29% to 51% when individuals’
subjective norms were entered into a regression equation in addition to their beliefs
concerning the illness. Furthermore, Norman et al. (2010) found that both subjective
norms and the attitudes towards behaviors added significantly to the prediction of
behavioral intention. Together, subjective norms and attitudes towards behaviors
accounted for 58% to 62% of total variance of participants’ intentions to carry out
different behaviors that involve a person with schizophrenia.
In addition to perceptions of social norms, perceived moral obligation could also be
important in predicting behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1991). It was found that including
moral norms, or how morally obligated one feels to behave or to not behave in a certain
way, improved the prediction of both behavioral intentions and actual behaviors related
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to moral issues, such as shoplifting, cheating, and lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). A more
recent meta-analysis found that including moral norms increases the variance explained
for behavioral intentions by 3% on average, especially when the behaviors have a moral
dimension, that is, the behaviors have potential impact on others’ welfare (Rivis,
Sheeran, & Armitage, 2009). Stigmatization against those with mental illnesses could be
considered as having a moral dimension, because discriminatory behaviors such as social
exclusion and deprivation of equal opportunities can have considerable negative impact
on these people’s welfare. It is, therefore, reasonable to take into consideration moral
norms, together with injunctive and descriptive norms, in predicting stigmatizing
behaviors towards those with mental illnesses.
There is a scarcity of research on how values and perceived norms are inter-related.
Because people’s value priorities and perceived social norms are both shaped by the
culture and society that they are a part of (Schwartz, 1992; Sherif, 1936), it is possible
that people, who develop certain value priorities as a result of cultural socialization,
would expect others in their reference group to share their values. This would result in
significant correlations between perceived social norms and personal value priorities.
Perceived norms could, therefore, potentially serve as a mediator between values and
stigmatizing behaviors towards mental illnesses. Specifically, because self-transcendence
values concern others’ welfare, priorities placed on self-transcendence values may
influence people’s moral considerations in relevant situations (Schwartz, 2010) and thus
influence people’s behavioral responses through moral norms. Some evidence has
provided support for the mediating role of perceived norms for the relationship between
values and behaviors. For example, Nordlund & Garvill (2002) found that personal
norms served as a mediator of the relationship between self-transcendence and
environmental values and pro-environmental behaviors. Alternatively, personal values
could certainly differ from perceptions of normative expectations, and predict behavioral
intentions and actual behaviors towards those with mental illnesses incrementally to
perceived norms.
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1.3.2

Self-Monitoring: a Potential Moderator of the Value-Stigma
Link

Perceived norms can influence people’s behaviors, but there appear to be individual
differences in the extent to which people are influenced by such perceptions. Of
particular importance in this respect is the characteristic referred to as self-monitoring
(Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Meliema & Bassili, 1995; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Selfmonitoring refers to people’s propensity to control their behaviors and to present
themselves in a desirable way to others. Individuals high in self-monitoring tendency are
more responsive to situational cues for appropriate behaviors and more likely to regulate
their self-presentations to achieve desired public images. In comparison, individuals low
in self-monitoring are less inclined to regulate their behaviors in order to gain approval of
others. For those people with low self-monitoring tendency, behaviors are more likely to
reflect personal dispositions such as attitudes and beliefs, than situational cues for
appropriate behaviors (Synder & Gangestad, 1986).
There is evidence that consistency between values and attitudes is moderated by
individual differences in self-monitoring (Meliema & Bassili, 1995; Prislin & Kovrlija,
1992). Meliema and Bassili (1995) assessed participants’ value endorsements by asking
them questions relevant to the values of merit, equality, religiosity, freedom, and respect
for authority (e.g., the value of merit- “Do you think that getting ahead in the world is
mostly a matter of ability and hard work, or of getting the breaks?”; the value of freedom“We should be tolerant of groups that do not share basic Canadian values”). Participants’
values endorsements were then correlated with their attitudes towards two policy issuesfixed quota for women in order to promote gender equality in workplaces, and censorship
for pornographic films. The authors also measured participants’ self-monitoring, and
tested whether self-monitoring moderated the strength of the value-attitude relationship.
The values of equality and freedom significantly predicted participants’ attitudes towards
fixed quota for female employees, and the relationships were significantly stronger for
low self-monitors than high self-monitors. Similarly, the values of freedom, religiosity,
and authority significantly added to the prediction of participants’ attitudes towards
banning pornographic films for low self-monitors, whereas only the value of freedom
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was related to high self-monitors’ attitudes on this issue. The authors therefore concluded
that personal values predicted people’s attitudes better for low self-monitors than high
self-monitors.
In addition to moderating the strength of the value-attitude relationship, self-monitoring
also moderates the extent to which people’s behavioral intentions are predicted by their
attitudes and norms. Prislin and Kovrlija (1992), for example, measured university
students’ attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control with respect to attending
every lecture at the beginning of a school year. Students’ self-monitoring tendency and
behavioral intentions towards full attendance were also measured. It was found that
attitudes predicted behavioral intentions for low self-monitors, whereas subjective norms
predicted behavioral intentions for high self-monitors.
Given these previous findings, it is reasonable to anticipate that people with different
self-monitoring will vary in how much their behavioral intentions towards those with
serious mental illness are related to their values, attitudes, and perceived norms. More
specifically, low self-monitors, compared to high self-monitors, should display a stronger
relationship between their self-transcendence/enhancement values and attitudes towards
behaviors involving those with mental illnesses. In addition, perceived social norms
should predict behavioral intentions towards those with mental illnesses better for high
self-monitors, whereas attitudes should predict behavioral intentions better for low selfmonitors.

1.4
Value-Based Manipulations in Influencing Attitudes
and Behaviors
Considering that value priorities, specifically with reference to self-transcendence and
self-enhancement values, are related to stigmatizing attitudes and behaviors towards
those with mental illness, can a value-based intervention be devised to improve responses
to these individuals? Value-based manipulations implemented by past researchers
commonly addressed one or more of the following three aspects: value priorities, value
accessibility, and cognitive support of values. The following section reviews how valuebased experimental manipulations that focused on each of the aforementioned aspects
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exert an impact on subsequent attitudes and behaviors. This review provides the
background for identifying the value-based manipulations that were tested in the studies
described in this thesis.

1.4.1

Value Priority

Values are motivational, and prioritized values imply stronger motivations to pursue
some end goals than others. One’s attitudes and behaviors are likely to be consistent with
the more prioritized values (Schwartz, 1992). Interventions that aim to induce desired
attitudes and behaviors by changing people’s value priorities have been examined for
their effectiveness in past research.
The value-confrontation technique used by Rokeach (1971) was an example of an
intervention designed to change value priorities. Rokeach tried to change participants’
value priorities by giving them fabricated feedback about values that students in their
university prioritized, while framing these putative findings in a negative way (e.g.,
“..students are more interested in their own freedom than freedom for other people.. ”).
This procedure was intended to create personal dissatisfaction with participants’ current
priorities. Compared to a control condition, the self-confrontation technique did
successfully induce higher self-reported importance of equality even months after the
manipulation. The intervention also led to more positive attitudes towards equal rights for
black people and more engagement in a movement that promoted their civil rights and
greater willingness to a support civil rights organization. Past research has found
evidence in support of the effectiveness of Rokeach’s value self-confrontation technique
in inducing attitude and behavioral change in several different domains (Greenstein,
1976; Rokeach & Cochkane, 1972; Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988).
In a more recent study, Maio et al. (2009) used a similar technique to change people’s
self-reported value priorities. The researchers provided fabricated information on the
value priorities endorsed by participants’ fellow students, and asked the participants to
compare their own values to these endorsed values. Four manipulation conditions were
implemented, each with respect to one of four higher-order values identified by Schwartz
(1992): self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to change, and conservation. In
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contrast to Rokeach (1971), Maio et al. framed the values that were allegedly endorsed by
university students in a positive way. The results showed that participants in each
condition changed their value priority in direction of the approved values and reduced the
priority of opposing values. However, Maio et al. did not test whether such changes in
self-reported value priorities led to any differences in subsequent attitudes and behaviors.

1.4.2

Value Accessibility

In addition to the importance attributed to a value, the likelihood of a value influencing
attitudes and behaviors is likely a function of how mentally accessible it is in a situation
(Feather, 1990; Schwartz, 2010; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Values are abstract
beliefs that are part of one’s knowledge structure. They can exert impact on attitudes and
behaviors only when they can be accessed mentally (Feather, 1990; Verplanken &
Holland, 2002). One way to make a value accessible and to facilitate value-consistent
attitudes and behaviors is through priming (Dreezens, Martijn, Tenbült, Kok, & de Vries,
2008; Macrae & Johnston, 1998; Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009; Verplanken &
Holland, 2002). Priming refers to influencing responses by antecedent activation of
particular representations or associations through exposure to a stimulus.
There is evidence that mere exposure to concepts related to a value, even at the
unconscious level, can make people more likely to act in a fashion consistent with that
value. For example, Macrae and Johnston (1998) primed participants for the value of
helpfulness by asking them to rearrange scrambled words into meaningful sentences.
Words related to the construct “helpfulness” (e.g., helped, assistance, aided, supported,
provided, etc.) were used in the experimental condition (e.g., she, luggage, revise, him,
help) but not in the control condition (e.g., grew, savings, waltz, her, rapidly). Even
though participants were not explicitly asked to think about the value “helpfulness”, those
primed with “helpfulness” related words were more likely to pick up a dropped pen for
the experimenter than were individuals who were not primed. Similarly, Verplanken and
Holland (2002) primed some participants for values related to the environment by asking
them to form an impression of a hypothetical person who adheres to these values such as
preserving nature and caring for future generations. The rest of the participants, who were
in the control condition, were ask to form an impression of a person adhering to values
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that are not related to the environment, such as perfectionism and enjoying the good
things of life. Participants in the priming condition put more weight on the environmental
aspects of a product in a subsequent consumer choice task than those in the control
condition.

1.4.3

Cognitive Support for Values

Values are often widely shared and unchallenged. This means that they may be perceived
as important while receiving little cognitive support or justification. As a result of the
lack of cognitive support for their prioritized values, people sometimes fail to act in line
with these values. Maio and colleagues (Maio & Olson, 1998) discussed such
discrepancies and suggested that people often do not act on their values because values
can function as “truisms”. They postulated that people may have little cognitive
justification or support for the importance attributed to specific values, and this
compromises the impact of values on behaviors, particularly when there are incentives to
behave inconsistently with the value.
Maio, Olson, Allen, and Bernard (2001) found that asking people to consciously think
about rationales or justifications related to the importance of values could increase valueconsistent behavior. In one study, Maio, Olson, Allen, et al. (2001) found that
contemplating reasons related to the value of equality led to less in-group favoritism and
more egalitarian behaviors in a subsequent point-allocating task, compared to priming of
the value using a thematic anagram solving task. In a second study, the authors found that
contemplating reasons related to the value of helpfulness led participants to volunteer
more time for a hypothetical future study, compared to being asked to rate one’s feeling
about this value. The self-reported importance of the promoted values did not differ
between participants who were primed with the values and those who were instructed to
consider reasons related to the values, suggesting that the effect of the manipulation on
subsequent behaviors was not through changes in value priorities. Maio et al. concluded
that thinking about reasons related to a value provides concrete cognitive support for
acting consistently with it, which decreases the chance that the value functions only as a
“truism”, and thus encourages people to subsequently behave more consistently with this
value.
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In expanding findings from Maio, Olson, Allen, et al. (2001), Karremans (2007) found
that thinking about reasons related to a value increases not only behaviors consistent with
the target value, but also behaviors consistent with other values expressing similar
motives. For example, Karreman found that thinking about reasons related to both the
value of equality, and the value of helpfulness, which expresses a similar motivation to
the value of equality (i.e., to be concerned of others’ welfare), led to more egalitarian
behaviors in a point-allocating task than the control condition. Moreover, participants
who thought about reasons related to the value of helpfulness showed more egalitarian
behaviors than those who were merely primed with the value in an anagram task.
Karreman’s finding provided additional empirical support for the “value-as-truism”
notion and the effectiveness of developing cognitive support for a value in facilitating
value-consistent behaviors.

1.4.4

Individual Differences in Sensitivity to Value-Based
Manipulations

People with varying pre-existing value priorities may react differently to the same valuebased manipulation. Depending on their pre-exiting value priorities, people might view
the value being promoted by a manipulation as more or less desirable. Consistent with
Feather’s (1990) expectancy-value model, if the value activated and promoted in the
manipulation is irrelevant to or even in conflict with their prioritized values, people could
perceive the promoted action as bearing little positive valence and therefore unattractive.
Therefore, people might be less responsive to value-based manipulations if the activated
value is in conflict with or irrelevant to their prioritized values.
For example, Verplankan and Holland (2002) found that after values related to concerns
about the environment were primed, only participants to whom the environmental values
were important to their self-concept sought out more environment-related information
concerning a product, and sequentially made more environmentally friendly consumer
choices. Participants to whom the environmental values were not initially important to
their self-concept neither paid more attention to environmentally related information of
products nor made more environmentally friendly choices after being primed.
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It is therefore expected that if an individual has a high pre-existing priority for the value
promoted in the value-based manipulation, he or she would be more likely to display
attitudes and behaviors consistent with the promoted value. In comparison, those for
whom the value being promoted does not have initially high priority would not be as
responsive to the manipulation, and would display attitudes and behaviors that are less
consistent with the promoted value.

1.5

Current Studies

The primary goal or the research described in this thesis was to examine if a value-based
manipulation could influence responses to those with serious mental illness, and provide
the basis for an effective intervention to reduce mental illness stigma. The manipulation
used in the current studies was modified from techniques used by Maio and colleagues
(e.g., Maio, Olson, Allen, et al., 2001) to increase cognitive support for a value as
reviewed in the last section. Specifically, participants were asked to contemplate reasons
related to certain values, so that the values are both more mentally accessible and have
greater cognitive support in order to facilitate subsequent value-consistent attitudes and
behaviors.
There are mainly two reasons for adopting a manipulation that focuses on changing value
accessibility and cognitive support rather than focusing on changing value priorities.
First, manipulations related to value accessibility and cognitive support have been more
widely used and have generated more empirical support in their effectiveness. In
comparison, manipulations targeted at changing value priorities, such as the selfconfrontation technique, have not been used in research as often, particularly in recent
years. Second, because self-transcendence values are already a very important value to
many, trying to further increase its importance might be less relevant and effective than
manipulations addressing accessibility and cognitive support.
In addition to testing the effectiveness of the value-based intervention, the studies also
assessed the extent to which participants’ attitudes and perceived norms towards the
behaviors mediate the value-behavioral intention link. The methods used will allow us to
address the latter issue both with respect to any impact of the manipulation and with
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respect to naturally occurring relationships between values, attitudes, norms and
behavioral intentions. The potential moderating role of self-monitoring was also
examined.
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Chapter 2

2

Study One

The methods used in this study were closely modeled after the procedures used by Maio,
Olson, Allen, et al. (2001). In this study, participants wrote about reasons related to either
self-transcendence values (in the Self-Transcendence condition) or self-enhancement
values (in the Self-Enhancement condition), or (in the control condition) described their
daily routine. Their attitudes towards a person described in a vignette as being diagnosed
with schizophrenia, attitudes towards behaviors involving this person, and their
behavioral intentions were measured. Participants’ value priorities, self-monitoring, and
their perceptions of norms towards behaviors involving the person in the vignette were
also measured.

2.1

Hypotheses

The hypotheses in this study were as follows:
H1. The Self-Transcendence condition will lead to the most positive attitudes towards the
person in vignette, attitudes towards behaviors with respect to this person, and behavioral
intentions among the three conditions, followed by the control condition, and the SelfEnhancement condition will lead to the least positive attitudes towards the person,
attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral intentions among the three conditions;
H2. Participants’ pre-existing value priorities will interact with manipulation conditions
in influencing their stigmatizing attitudes and behaviors: a higher initial selftranscendence value priority would be associated with greater effect of the SelfTranscendence condition, and a higher initial self-enhancement value priority will be
associated with greater effect of the Self-Enhancement condition;
H3. The effect of the manipulation conditions on behavioral intentions will be mediated
by attitudes towards behaviors and perceived norms with reference to the behaviors;
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H4. The self-reported priority placed on self-transcendence values will be related to more
positive attitudes towards the person in vignette, attitudes towards behaviors involving
this person, and behavioral intentions; and the self-reported priority placed on selfenhancement values will be related to more negative attitudes towards the person,
attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral intentions;
H5. The relationship between value priorities and behavioral intentions will be mediated
by attitudes towards behaviors and perceived norms towards the behaviors;
H6. Lower self-monitoring will be associated with stronger relationship between value
priorities and attitudes towards behaviors, stronger relationship between attitudes towards
behaviors and behavioral intentions, and weaker relationship between perceived norms
and behavioral intentions.

2.2
2.2.1

Method
Participants

A total number of 180 participants were recruited. Participants completed this study
through the online platform Amazon’s Mechanical Turks (MTurk). Procedures were
administered, and completed through Qultrics.com. Among the 180 participants who took
part in the study, 50 were excluded for providing invalid answers for the value activation
manipulation (i.e., clearly off topic or nonsense answers) or spending less than 20
seconds reading the 300-word vignette, which was judged to indicate a lack of attention.
The remaining participants (N=130) included 70 females and 60 males. The age of the
participants ranged from 19 to 77, with a mean age of 37 (SD=13.4). Among these 130
participants, 120 reported to speak English as their first language; 9 reported that English
is not their first language; one participant did not provide response to this question.

2.2.2

Procedure

Participants were told that they were taking part in two separate studies, the first one
being a reasoning task and the second an investigation of how impressions of others are
formed. These two supposedly separate studies were actually one study, and the
deception procedure was used to decrease the likelihood that participants would infer the
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connection between the value manipulation and their subsequent responses to the
vignette.
Participants first filled out the pre-manipulation measure of value priorities, and were
then randomly assigned to one of the three value-related manipulation conditions (SelfEnhancement vs. Self-Transcendence vs. Control), followed by a post-manipulation
measure of value priorities. Participants were then told that they would take part in a
different, second study. In this part of the protocol, they first read a vignette of a person
who was diagnosed with schizophrenia and who is currently in recovery. Participants
then rated their attitudes towards this person, attitudes towards varying behaviors
reflecting preferred social distance with respect to this person, and their perception of
norms regarding these behaviors. Participants’ self-monitoring was then assessed,
followed by a measure of their intention to engage in the behaviors previously described.
At the end, participants were asked about questions related to demographic characteristics
(i.e., sex, age, and whether English is their first language) and suspicions regarding there
being a relationship between these two allegedly independent studies. They were then
debriefed and redirected to MTurk where they received compensation of 75 cents for
their participation.

2.2.3

Materials

Pre-manipulation value priority measure
The pre-manipulation value importance measure was derived on the basis of measures
used in Maio et al. (2009) and Norman, Sorrentino, Gawronski, et al. (2010). Participants
were given a list of 16 values, with 4 covering each of the four higher-order categories
(i.e., Self-enhancement; Self-transcendence; Conservation; Openness to Change), and
were asked to rate how much each value acts as a “guiding principle in my life” on a
scale of 0 (“opposed to my principle”) to 8 (“of supreme importance”). See Appendix C
for the pre- and post-manipulation measure of value priority.
Value-based manipulation
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In all three conditions, participants were told that the study was a survey of the value
system and reasoning processes of adults. They were told that the computer would
randomly choose a topic from a database for them to write about, and that they would be
given 8 minutes for their writing task. Participants were encouraged to write as much as
possible by using abstract reasoning or/and examples. In both the Self-Transcendence and
the Self-Enhancement conditions, participants were given examples of how each value
could be supported or opposed in reasoning. In the control condition, participants were
simply instructed to describe what they would usually do in a typical day. See Appendix
D for the instructions used in each condition.
Post-manipulation value priority measure
This measure took place for all participants after value activation manipulation. The
assessment followed the same format as the pre-manipulation value priority measure, but
used 16 specific values items that were different from those used in the pre-manipulation
measure (Appendix C).
Vignette for a person with schizophrenia
After being informed that they had completed the first study, participants were told that
they would now be participating in the second study on impression formation. They were
asked to read a vignette of a person. The vignette was modified from one originally
prepared by Angermeyer and colleagues (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003, 2004) for
population surveys in Germany and subsequently used by in Norman et al. (2010). It
contains both symptom and recovery information concerning of a person (Alex)
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Half of the participants read the vignette in which the
person was described as a woman, and the other half read one in which the person was a
man. All other information was the same in the two versions of vignette. See Appendix E
for the vignette.
Attitude towards person and attitudes towards behaviors
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to rate their attitudes towards Alex on
a 7-point scale for four evaluative semantic differential type items (unpleasant-pleasant;
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bad-good; nasty-nice; attractive-unattractive) (Appendix F). Then, participants indicated
their attitudes towards six different behaviors involving this person. Their attitudes
towards each behavior were measured using the same 7-point scale on the four
aforementioned evaluative sematic differential items for each one of the six behaviors
(Norman et al., 2010) (Appendix G). The six behaviors were: go to party at his/her house;
have lunch with Alex; do schoolwork with Alex; trust Alex to take care of your child; be
willing to support having your sibling or child marry Alex; and recommend Alex for a
job. These six behaviors were adapted from the Bogardus Social Distance Scale
(Bogardus, 1925), and have been frequently used in measuring preferred social distance,
or stigmatizing behaviors, towards those with mental illness (e.g., Link, 1987; Norman et
al., 2008).
Perceived norms
The same questions used by Norman et al. (2008) were utilized to measure participants’
subjective norms. To measure subjective descriptive norms, participants were asked to
rate from 1(“They certainly would”) to 7(“They certainly would not”) how likely people
important to them would themselves engage in each one of the six behaviors. To measure
their subjective injunctive norms, participants were asked to rate from 1(“Very strongly
approve”) to 7(“Very strongly disapprove”) to indicate how people important to them
would react if they engaged in each one of the six behaviors involving the person in
vignette. To measure the moral norms, participants were asked to rate from 1(“Very
strong obligation”) to 7(“No obligation at all”) to indicate how much morally obligated
that they felt that they should engage in each one of the six behaviors with reference to
Alex. Participants’ perceived norms for each of the six behaviors were measured as the
average of the three items for that behavior. See Appendix H for the measure of
perceived norms.
Self-monitoring scale
After participants finished the measure of perceived norms, they completed the 18-item
Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The scale consists of 18 statements
to each of which participants answer “True” or “False” to reflect the extent to which it is
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an accurate description of their behaviors. See Appendix I for the Self-Monitoring Scale.
A meta-analysis (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000) showed that there were mainly three latent
factors captured in the Self-Monitoring Scale: Acting, or the ability to act in a way
suggested by social cues, measured by items such as “I would probably make a good
actor”; Extraversion, measured by items such as “In a group of people I am rarely the
center of attention (reversely coded)”; and Other-Directedness, or the level of motivation
to engage in self-monitoring, measured by items such as “I guess I put on a show to
impress or entertain people”.
Behavioral intentions
After completing the above measures, participants indicated their willingness to engage
in the six behaviors involving the person in the vignette by rating on a 5-point scale (from
“I certainly would” to “I certainly would not”) the likelihood they would engage in each
behavior (Appendix J).

2.3

Results

As previously mentioned, 60 participants were excluded from the analyses for paying
inadequate attention to the manipulation or the vignette. Although including these
participants in the analyses did not significantly change the pattern of the results, they
were nonetheless excluded from the analyses in order to achieve more accurate
estimations of the effects. 18 participants expressed their suspicion that the “two studies”
were related, and that the hypothesis of the study was on how personal values were
related to responses to people with mental illness. Excluding these participants from the
analyses did not yield significantly different results than when they were included. These
participants were therefore included in the analyses reported.
All outcome measures were recoded to generate a positive key, so that a higher score
always represents a more positive response. As recommended by Schwartz (1992), a
mean rating across all values was calculated for each participant, and the mean was
subtracted from each value of the participant to generate a new set of value scores. The
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new value scores represented the relative importance that a participant assigned to each
value.
To test for internal consistency for the measurement scales used in our study, Cronbach’s
α was calculated for the attitudes toward the person (AttP) scale, the attitudes towards
behaviors (AttB) scale, the behavioral intentions (BI) scale, the self-monitoring scale, and
the perceived norms scale. The Cronbach’s α was .81 for the AttP scale, .95 for the AttB
scale, .84 for the BI scale, .76 for the self-monitoring scale, and .90 for the perceived
norms scale. An average score was calculated for each participant on each one of the
above scales except for the self-monitoring scale, for which all items were summed up to
generate a self-monitoring score for each participant. See Table 1 for means and standard
deviations for all the aforementioned variables and their inter-correlations.

2.3.1

Tests of Hypothesis 1 and 2: Effects of the Value-Reasoning
Manipulation, and Its Interaction with Pre-Existing Value
Priorities

To test effects of the value-reasoning manipulation and its potential interaction with
participants’ pre-existing priorities on self-transcendence values and self-enhancement
values, Univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were carried out. Three Univariate
ANOVA were first conducted on AttP, AttB, and BI, respectively, with the manipulation
conditions as the independent variable and the pre-manipulation ratings on selftranscendence values as the covariate. The interaction term for the condition and the premanipulation ratings on self-transcendence values was also entered in the model. Another
three Univariate ANOVA were then conducted on AttP, AttB, and BI, respectively, with
the conditions as the independent variable and the pre-manipulation ratings on selfenhancement values as the covariate. The interaction term for the condition and the premanipulation ratings on self-enhancement values was also entered in the model. The premanipulation ratings on self-transcendence and self-enhancement values were entered as
the covariate in separate tests instead of both being entered as predictors of the dependent
variables in the same test, because these two scores tend to have high negative
correlations and entering them both in one test could make the results less interpretable.
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When the pre-manipulation ratings on self-transcendence value was controlled for as a
covariate, the manipulation condition did not have any significant effect on attitudes
towards Alex, F(2,118)=1.33, p=.27, attitudes towards behaviors with respect to Alex,
F(2,114)=.87, p=.42, or behavioral intentions towards Alex, F(2,116)=.70, p=.49. No
significant interaction between the manipulation conditions and pre-manipulation ratings
on self-transcendence value was found on AttP, F(2,118)=1.04, p=.38, AttB,
F(2,114)=1.16, p=.32, or BI, F(2,116)=2.10, p=.13. Similarly, when the pre-manipulation
ratings on self-enhancement value was controlled for as a covariate, the manipulation
condition did not have any significant effect on AttP, F(2,118)=.69, p=.50, AttB,
F(2,114)=1.34, p=.27, or BI, F(2,116)=.50, p=.61, nor did the interaction between
conditions and pre-manipulation ratings on self-enhancement value have any significant
effect on AttP, F(2,118)=.14, p=.87, AttB, F(2,114)=1.18, p=.31 or BI, F(2,116)=2.24,
p=.11.
To further investigate whether participants’ responses vary as a function of their gender
and the gender of Alex, and whether there was any interaction between them and with the
manipulation conditions, a Univariate ANOVA was conducted on AttP, AttB, and BI,
respectively, with the manipulation conditions, participant’s gender, the gender of Alex,
and all two-way and three-way interactions among them entered as independent
variables. The results showed that there was a significant main effect for the gender of
Alex on both participants’ attitudes towards Alex, F(1,117)=9.72, p=.002, and their
attitudes towards behaviors with respect to Alex, F(1,113)=4.53, p=.036, but not on their
behavioral intention towards Alex, F(1,115)=2.12, p=.15. Participants showed more
positive AttP (M=4.45, SD=1.14, vs. M=3.94, SD=.89) and AttB (M=3.57, SD=1.19, vs.
M=3.24, SD=.99) when Alex was described as a female than a male. For behavioral
intention, a significant interaction between participants’ gender and the manipulation
conditions was found, F(2,115)=4.11, p=.019. Pair-wise comparisons corrected by
Bonferroni showed that female participants in Self-Enhancement condition (M=3.07,
SD=.86) showed significantly more positive behavioral intention towards Alex than
female participants in the Self-Transcendence condition (M=2.43, SD=.76), p=.029. Such
a pattern was not observed among male participants.
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The results suggested that participants’ attitudes towards the person described as having
schizophrenia in the vignette, their attitudes towards behaviors involving this person, and
their preferred social distance measured by their behavioral intentions, did not vary as a
function of the value-reasoning manipulation implemented in this study. Participants’
pre-existing self-reported priorities on self-transcendence and self-enhancement values
did not seem to influence how they responded to the value-based manipulations. Overall,
it appears that the data therefore failed to support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
The examination of the effects of participants’ gender and the gender of the person
described in the vignette suggested that participants tended to have more positive
responses, especially on their attitudes towards the person and their attitudes towards
behaviors with respect to this person, when this person was a female than male. The
implication of the interaction between participants’ gender and the manipulation
conditions on behavioral intention was less clear: it was not apparent with regard to why
the Self-Enhancement condition led to more positive behavioral intention than the SelfTranscendence condition among the female participants but not the male participants, or
whether such an effect would replicate.

2.3.2

Test of Hypothesis 3: Attitudes towards Behaviors and
Perceived Norms as Mediators for the Effect of the ValueReasoning Manipulation

To test Hypothesis 3, the SPSS plug-in PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) was used to examine
the mediating effects of attitudes towards behavior and perceived norms on the
relationship between value priorities and behavioral intention. PROCESS was selected as
the analytical tool because it (1) allows the inclusion of more than one mediator, and
accounts for the correlations between mediators in calculating mediational effects; (2)
quantifies both the direct effect of the predictor variable on the dependent variable and
the indirect effect (i.e., mediational effect) with reference to each mediator, (3) utilizes
bootstrapping to address issues related to the biased assumption underlying the frequently
used Sobel’s test of the mediation, and to estimate the confidence intervals for the
indirect effects (Hayes, 2012). It is, however, worth noting that because the valuereasoning manipulation was found to have no significant effect on attitudes towards
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behaviors, a mediational path between the intervention and behavioral intentions through
attitudes towards behaviors should not be expected, according to Baron & Kenny (1986).
The manipulation conditions were entered as the independent variable, behavioral
intentions as the dependent variable, and attitudes towards behaviors and perceived
norms as two mediators, in PROCESS. 1000 bootstraps were carried out to generate
estimates for the indirect, or mediational, effects. The results suggested that the valuebased manipulation did not have any significant direct effect on BI, B=.05, SE=.06,
t(87)=.86, p=.39, nor did it have any significant indirect effect on BI through AttB, B=.05, SE=.04, Z=-1.27, p=.20, or perceived norms, B=-.03, SE=.05, Z=-.62, p=.54.
Hypothesis 3 was therefore not supported by the data.1

2.3.3

Test of Hypothesis 4: Linking Value Priorities, Attitudes, and
Behavioral Intentions

In order to examine whether the manipulation changed participants’ self-reported
priorities on these values, a repeated measure ANOVA was carried out on selftranscendence values and the self-enhancement values, respectively, each with the preand post-manipulation ratings as the within-subject, repeated variable, and the
manipulation conditions as the between-subject variable. Participants’ ratings on selftranscendence values did not change from pre-manipulation to post-manipulation survey
as a function of the manipulation conditions, F(2,120)=1.03, p=.36. Their ratings on selfenhancement values, however, did change from before to after the manipulation as a
function of conditions, F(2,120)=4.05, p=.02: participants in the control group rated selfenhancement values significantly higher in the post-manipulation survey (M=-.53,
SE=.14) than in the pre-manipulation survey (M=-.78, SD=.14), p=.04; participants in the
Self-Transcendence condition rated self-enhancement values marginally higher in the
pre-manipulation survey (M=-.58, SD=.15) than in the post-manipulation survey (M=-

1

Readers should be cautioned that, because PROCESS used list-wise deletions for missing data, more
participants were excluded from the mediational analyses than the analyses conducted on AttP, AttB, and
BI, respectively. There might be discrepancies between results from other analyses and analyses conducted
using PROCESS due to difference in data exclusion, and discretion is recommended when comparing these
results.
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.83, SD=.15), p=.05. Even though there were some changes from pre- to postmanipulation ratings on value priorities, the value that was promoted in the specific
condition did not gain more importance as a result of the manipulation. This is in line
with findings in the previous research that thinking about reasons related to a value would
not increase the mean self-reported importance of that value (Maio, et al., 2001). See
Table 2 for mean and standard deviation for each higher-order value before and after the
manipulation, and the correlations between ratings at time 1 and time 2 for each value.
To assess the relationship between values priority and attitudes and behaviors specified in
Hypothesis 4, multiple regressions were carried out on AttP, AttB, and BI, respectively,
with either post-manipulation self-transcendence or self-enhancement value priority
entered as the predictor. Post-manipulation ratings on the self-transcendence and selfenhancement values were found highly correlated (r=-.62, p<.01) in this study, and
entering highly correlated predictors simultaneously into the same regression would make
the interpretation of the coefficients less straightforward (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2003). Therefore, ratings of these two values were separately entered into the equations
in predicting the dependent variables, rather than being treated as predictors
simultaneously.
Post-manipulation self-transcendence value priority marginally predicted participants’
attitudes towards Alex, B=.20, t(124)=3.64, p=.059, did not significantly predict attitudes
towards behaviors involving Alex, B=.15, t(120)=1.28, p=.23, but did significantly
predict participants’ behavioral intentions towards Alex, B=.26, t(122)=3.25, p=.002.
Participants’ gender (female coded as 0; male as 1) did not provide additional prediction
to AttP, B=-.07, t(123)=-.38, p=.70, AttB, B=-.05, t(119)=-.25, p=.81, or BI, B=-.11,
t(121)=-.72, p=.48, above the prediction of self-transcendence value priority. However,
the gender of the person in the vignette (female coded as 0; male as 1) provided
incremental prediction to AttP, B=-.46, t(123)=-2.53, p=.01, but not to AttB, B=-.28,
t(119)=-1.14, p=.16, or BI, B=-.17, t(121)=-1.20, p=.23, above the prediction of selftranscendence value priority.
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Post-manipulation self-enhancement value priority did not predict AttP, B=-.13, t(124)=1.38, p=.17, AttB, B=-.07, t(120)=-.68, p=.50, and marginally predicted BI, B=-.14,
t(122)=-1.84, p=.068. Participants’ gender (female coded as 0; male as 1) did not provide
additional prediction to AttP, B=-.09, t(123)=-.48, p=.63, AttB, B=-.07, t(119)=-.34,
p=.73, or BI, B=-.14, t(121)=-.96, p=.34, above the prediction of self-enhancement value
priority. However, the gender of the person in the vignette (female coded as 0; male as 1)
provided incremental prediction to AttP, B=-.48, t(123)=-2.64, p=.009, but not to AttB,
B=-.31, t(119)=-1.53, p=.13, or BI, B=-.20, t(121)=-1.38, p=.17, above the prediction of
self-enhancement value priority.
The results showed some supportive evidence for Hypothesis 4: self-transcendence value
priority was significantly related to, and self-enhancement value priority marginally
related to, participants’ behavioral intentions towards the person described as having
schizophrenia in the vignette. Even though the priorities of these two values were not
significantly related to attitudes towards the person or attitudes towards behaviors, the
unstandardized coefficients (i.e. B) were consistent with the theoretical relationship
between these values and stigmatizing attitudes: self-transcendence values had positive
relationships with attitudes towards the person, attitudes towards behaviors, and
behavioral intentions, whereas self-enhancement values had negative relationships with
them. Moreover, it seemed that the gender of the person in vignette influenced
participants’ attitudes towards the person over and above their value priorities.
Specifically, participants evaluated the person in vignette more positively if that person
was described as a female than a male. However, the gender of the person in the vignette
did not predict participants’ attitudes towards behaviors involving this person and their
behavioral intentions in addition to the prediction of value priorities.

2.3.4

Test of Hypothesis 5: Attitudes towards Behaviors and
Perceived Norms as Mediators of the Value-Stigma Link

To assess the potential mediating effects of attitudes towards behavior and perceived
norms on the relationship between value priorities and behavioral intentions, PROCESS
was again used. Post-manipulation self-reported priority on self-transcendence values
was first entered in PROCESS as the predictor; attitudes towards behaviors and perceived
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norms were both designated as the mediators; behavioral intention was entered as the
dependent variable. 1000 bootstraps were carried out to generate estimates for the
mediational effects. The results showed that self-transcendence value priority had a
significant direct effect on behavioral intention, B=.18, SE=.06. t(84)=3.05, p=.003, had a
significant indirect effect on behavioral intention through attitudes towards behaviors,
B=.07, SE=.03, Z=2.01, p=.045, but not through perceived norms, B=.06, SE=.05,
Z=1.23, p=.22. Rather than being a mediator, perceived norms added significantly to the
prediction of behavioral intention, B=.41, SE=.07, t(84)=6.17, p<.001, over and above
provided by Self-transcendence and attitudes towards behavior. See Figure 4(a) for an
illustration of the relationships among these variables.
The same analysis was conducted with self-enhancement values entered as the predictor.
The results showed that self-enhancement values had no significant direct effect on
behavioral intention, B=-.09, SE=.05, t(84)=-1.71, p=.09, and no indirect effect on
behavioral intention through attitudes towards behavior, B=-.04, SE=.03, Z=-1.22, p=.22,
or through perceived norms , B=-.04, SE=.04, Z=-.82, p=.41. Rather than serving as
mediators, attitudes towards behavior, B=.24, SE=.06, t(84)=3.78, p<.001, and perceived
norms, B=.40, SE=.07, t(84)=5.79, p<.001, independently predicted behavioral intention
over and above self-enhancement value priority. See Figure 4(b) for an illustration.
It was therefore concluded that Hypothesis 5 received mixed support from the data:
attitudes towards behaviors partially mediated the relationship between selftranscendence values and behavioral intention, but did not mediate the relationship
between self-enhancement values and behavioral intention. Perceived norms did not
serve as a mediator to the value-behavior relationships, but rather was an independent
positive predictor of behavioral intention.

2.3.5

Test of Hypothesis 6: Self-Monitoring as a Moderator

In order to test for Hypothesis 6, that self-monitoring would moderate the relationships
between value priority and attitudes towards behaviors, between attitudes towards
behavior and behavioral intention, and between perceived norms and behavioral
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intentions, multiple regressions were conducted following the suggestion by Baron and
Kenny (1986) for testing moderating effects.
To examine the potential moderator effect of self-monitoring on the relationship between
self-transcendence value priority and attitudes towards behavior, a product term for postmanipulation self-transcendence value priority and self-monitoring was calculated. Next,
participants’ post-manipulation self-transcendence value priority, self-monitoring scores,
and their product term were simultaneously entered into a multiple regression to predict
attitudes towards behaviors. As recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986), only the
coefficient for the product term was interpreted as the moderating effect; coefficients for
the main terms were not interpreted as they were not meaningful in the presence of the
interaction term. The result showed that self-monitoring did not significantly moderate
the relationship between self-transcendence value and attitudes towards behaviors, B=.54,
t(113)=.93, p=.36. Similarly, the moderating role of self-monitoring on the relationship
between self-enhancement value priority and attitudes towards behavior were examined
by entering post-manipulation self-enhancement value priority, self-monitoring scores,
and their product terms into a multiple regression in predicting attitudes towards
behaviors. Self-monitoring was found to have no significant moderating effect on the
relationship between self-enhancement value and attitudes towards behaviors, B=-1.01,
t(113)=-1.82, p=.07.
The potential moderating role of self-monitoring on the relationships between attitudes
towards behaviors and behavioral intention, and between perceived norms and behavioral
intentions, were examined using procedures similar to those described above. Selfmonitoring was found to neither significantly moderate the attitude-behavioral intention
relationship, B=.12, t(113)=.47, p=.64., nor the norms-behavioral intention relationship,
B=-.31, t(88)=-1.13, p=.26. In conclusion, Hypothesis 6 was not supported. People with
different self-monitoring tendencies were not found to differ in the extent to which their
value priorities were related to their attitudes towards behaviors, the extent to which their
attitudes towards behaviors were related to self-reported likelihood of engaging in these
behaviors, or the extent to which perceived norms were related to their behavioral
intentions.
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2.3.6

Post-Hoc Exploratory Analyses

Because the primary goal of the current studies was to find a value-related manipulation
that could be effective in reducing stigmatization of people with mental illnesses,
additional exploratory analyses were carried out in the hope of gaining insight into
potential ways to modify the manipulation to increase its effectiveness.
During the manipulation in the first study, participants were instructed to think about
reasons related to a value, and these reasons could be supportive of or/and contrary to the
value. This procedure was used to provide as parallel an intervention as possible to that
described by Maio, Olson, Allen, et al. (2001). Therefore, participants in the same
experimental condition could have argued in different directions. Maio et al found that
those participants who provided a greater proportion of reasons in favor of a value were
more likely to subsequently demonstrate behavior consistent with that value. A post hoc
analysis was carried out to examine the relationships between the content of the reasons
provided by participants and their responses to the person described in the vignette. To
investigate this possibility, participants’ argument directions (i.e., whether they provided
reasons in support of or against the value prompt in the manipulation) were coded, and
were examined with regard to how they were related to attitudes towards the person,
attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral intentions.2
The essays that participants in the Self-Enhancement and the Self-Transcendence
condition wrote during the manipulation were coded independently by two raters. Each
participant’s essay was classified as only favoring the importance of the value, only
opposing its importance, or providing both supportive and opposing reasons. Consensus
was then arrived for the classification of each participant’s essay. In the SelfEnhancement condition, 18 participants were classified as having provided only reasons
in favor of self-enhancement values (pro-SE), 6 only argued against them (anti-SE), and

2

Maio, Olson, Allen, et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between argument and subsequent
behaviors by counting the number of pro- and anti-value reasons and instantiations, instead of categorizing
them by their overall directions. We repeated their approach but did not find any significant relationship
between the number of pro- or anti-value reasons or instantiations and participants’ behavioral intention.
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17 provided reason in both directions (both-SE). In the Self-Transcendence condition, 32
people argued for self-transcendence values (pro-ST), only one argued entirely against
them (anti-ST), and 7 people argued both ways (both-ST). The only person who argued
against self-transcendence values was excluded from the following analyses, as he/she
was the only member of that group.
One-way ANOVAs were carried out on attitudes towards Alex, attitudes towards
behaviors involving Alex, and behavioral intentions towards Alex, respectively, using the
above coding of argument directions as the independent variable. Argument direction was
found to have a significant effect on AttP, F(4,74)=2.88, p=.028, AttB, F(4,73)=4.52,
p=.033, and BI, F(4,73)=4.64, p=.002. Post hoc comparisons between different argument
directions, corrected by Bonferroni to control for Type I errors, showed that for AttP, the
anti-SE group (M=4.88, SD=.74) showed significantly more positive responses than the
both-ST group (M=3.18, SD=1.07), p=.02. Similarly, for attitudes towards behaviors, the
anti-SE group (M=4.42, SD=.37) had significantly more positive responses than the bothST group (M=2.21, SD=.92), p=.012. For behavioral intention, the anti-SE group
(M=3.81, SD=.39) had significantly higher scores than all other groups: people who
argued against self-enhancement values had more positive behavioral intentions than
those who argued for self-enhancement values (M=2.61, SD=.91), p=.01, those who
argued both ways for self-enhancement values (M=2.59, SD=.62), p=.01, those who
argued for self-transcendence values (M=2.65, SD=.74), p=.007, and those who argued
both ways for self-transcendence values (M=2.12, SD=.66), p=.001. See Table 3 for the
means and standard deviations of the three dependent variables for the five argument
groups. Other pair-wise comparisons between argument directions for attitudes towards
person, attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral intentions were not statistically
significant.
One-way ANOVA on pre-manipulation value priorities by argument directions suggested
that there was a relation between the argument directions and initial values. Participants’
pre-manipulation priority ratings on the self-transcendence values, F(4,71)=4.24,
p=0.004, and the self-enhancement values, F(4,71)=3.87, p=0.007, varied significantly as
a function of their argument directions, suggesting that participants who argued in
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different directions with regard to the values had different pre-existing values priorities.
Pair-wise comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed a significant higher premanipulation self-transcendence value priority for the anti-SE group (M=1.31, SD=0.76)
than the pro-SE group (M=0.08, SD=0.87), p=.034; and a significant lower premanipulation self-enhancement value priority for the anti-SE group (M=-1.59, SD=1.1)
than the pro-SE group (M=0.04, SD=0.98), p=.007. Differences between other pairs on
the pre-manipulation ratings for these two values did not reach statistical significance.
See Table 4 for the means and standard deviations of the initial value priorities reported
by participants with different argument directions.
It is important to note that, when pre-manipulation self-reported priorities on the selfenhancement and self-enhancement values were included as covariates for the Univariate
ANOVA on AttP, AttB, and BI, the effect of argument directions remained significant for
attitudes towards behaviors, F(4,67)=4.24, p=.004, and behavioral intentions,
F(4,71)=4.73, p=.002.

2.4

Discussion

The value-related manipulation implemented in this study was not effective in
influencing people’s stigmatizing attitudes or behavioral intentions towards the person
described in a vignette as diagnosed with schizophrenia. However, the significant
positive correlation between self-transcendences value and behavioral intentions towards
the person portrayed as having schizophrenia was consistent with findings from past
literature. Consistent with our hypothesis, it was found that attitudes towards behaviors
partially mediated this relationship. There was no evidence for perceived norms
mediating the relationship between values and behavioral intentions. Rather, perceived
norms provided significant additional prediction to behavioral intention independently of
priority attributed to self-transcendence values.
The results of the exploratory analyses suggested some potential modifications to the
value-reasoning manipulation that may make it more effective in eliciting positive
responses towards those with serious mental illness. Participants who provided solely
anti-SE arguments had more positive behavioral intentions towards Alex than participants
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with other argument directions, including those who argued for the self-transcendence
values. According to Schwartz’s model of value structure, the self-enhancement values
oppose the self-transcendence values, implying that the pursuit of one would interfere the
pursuit of the other. It would thus be reasonable to assume that arguing against selfenhancement values is similar to arguing for self-transcendence values. But why would
people arguing against self-enhancement values have more positive responses to Alex
than those arguing for self-transcendence values? One explanation is that those anti-SE
participants had higher self-transcendence values and lower self-enhancement values to
begin with, and that their differences in attitudes and behavioral intentions reflected such
pre-existing differences in their value priorities. However, the effect of argument
direction was still significant when participants’ pre-manipulation value priorities were
included as covariates, suggesting that there may have been some impact of arguing
against the self-enhancement values, which made participants more positive in their
attitudes and behavioral intentions towards the person described in the vignette.
A close examination of the content of the material written by the participants revealed
that some of those who had argued for the self-transcendence value saw it as being
compatible with self-enhancement values (e.g. “By helping others I help myself”; “If
others’ welfare is not in good standing, we risk our own welfare”). In contrast, for those
who had argued against self-enhancement values, such values were seen as being
opposed to the realization of self-transcendent goals (e.g. “When one strives to attain a
high level of wealth or social values one must do things that tend to undermine the
personal goals of others, which often leave one group or another oppressed”).
Taking a perspective in which the self-transcendence and self-enhancement values are
seen as “compatible” versus in conflict with each other might have result in differences in
subsequent attitudes and behavioral intentions. Rokeach (1968) suggested that many
situations that people encounter can be related to two or more values in conflict, and that
people have to choose between the conflicting values in order to determine their own
behaviors in that situation. Similarly, Schwartz (2010) emphasized the importance of
trade-offs between competing values in guiding behaviors. When evaluating how
desirable a behavior is, people consider the potential costs and benefits involved in this
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behavior. Such costs (e.g. “helping others would cost me time/money”) and benefits (e.g.
“helping others would make me feel better about myself”) could be material or
psychological. Schwartz suggested that a behavior such as helping others would be most
likely to occur when the value (i.e., self-transcendence values) that promotes this
behavior is of high priority while its opposing value (i.e., self-enhancement value) is of
low priority. In such case, the cost-benefit calculation would clearly favor the behavior as
a result of high perceived benefit and low perceived cost.
In the current study, the participants who generated exclusively anti-SE reasons reached a
clear preference for actions consistent with the self-transcendence values over actions
consistent with self-enhancement values. In comparison, other participants may have
either not seen the conflict between the two opposing values and the cost-benefit tradeoff involved in acting with self-transcendence values (pro-ST participants), or did not
reach a conclusion that clearly favors acting in line with self-transcendence values over
acting in line with self-enhancement values (both-ST and both-SE participants). As a
result, when facing the choice between decisions to accept and tolerate the person
described in vignette or to be protective of oneself and to socially reject this person, the
decision would be more ambiguous and thus less consistent with self-transcendence
values for participants providing arguments in other directions than for the anti-SE
participants.
There are a few limitations in this study that need to be addressed in the later study. First,
because participants in the control group also filled out the pre- and post-manipulation
value survey, it is possible that values were also activated for them, and subsequently
influenced their responses to the dependent variables. A control group for whom the
concept of value is not mentioned at all is needed to determine whether participants’
attitudes and behaviors would be influenced by merely filling out value surveys, and to
provide an unbiased baseline to be compared with the attitudes and behaviors of the
participants going through the manipulations.
Second, even though there is evidence in support of MTurk being a valid platform for
conducting online psychology research (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012), one third of
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participants recruited for the current study had to be excluded for not paying adequate
attention to our main manipulation or providing invalid essay answers during the
manipulation. Using a different platform on which participants are more attentive to the
manipulations could help decrease the number of exclusions and increase the power of
the tests.
Third, Maio et al. (2001) suggested that a possible underlying mechanism for the effect of
generating reasons related to a value on promoting value-consistent behavior was that
people would be more confident in acting consistently with a value if it receives concrete
cognitive support. People’s confidence in their value priorities was not assessed in this
current study, and therefore it was not possible to test whether people’s confidence in
their values changed as a function of the manipulation, and whether such confidence was
related to their subsequent attitudes and behaviors. A measure of value confidence or
certainty will be implemented in the second study to further investigate this issue.
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Chapter 3

3

Study Two

Based on the foregoing rationale, modifications were made to the value-reasoning
manipulation used in Study 1 in order to potentially improve its effectiveness in
influencing attitudes and behavioral intentions to those with mental illnesses. In order to
test the hypothesis that arguing against self-enhancement values would be more effective
in inducing more positive responses towards those with serious mental illness than
arguing for self-transcendence values, a pro-ST condition and an anti-SE condition were
implemented. Participants were asked to only generate reasons in support of selftranscendence values in the pro-ST condition, and to only generate reasons against selfenhancement values in the anti-SE condition. In addition, in order to examine if explicitly
thinking about both the costs and benefits involved in pursuing self-transcendence values
would increase value-consistent responses, a third condition was implemented in which
participants were asked to think about reasons that favor self-transcendence values over
self-enhancement values (combination condition). It was also decided to include two
control conditions. As noted earlier, the control group in the previous study also
completed the Schwartz Value Survey, which may have, in itself, increased salience of
values and reduced the likelihood of finding difference with other conditions. In Study 2,
in addition to having a control condition identical to the one used in the previous study
(control-value condition), another control condition was included, in which no valuerelated measure or manipulation was administered to the participants (control-no value
condition).
In addition to examining the effect of the modified manipulations, Study 2 provides an
opportunity to replicate findings regarding the relationship between the selftranscendence/self-enhancement value priorities and attitudes and behavioral intentions
with respect to the individual with schizophrenia. The mediating roles of attitudes
towards behaviors and perceived norms will be tested again with this second sample. All
the dependent measures used in Study 1 were also included in the second study with one
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exception: the self-monitoring scale was omitted, as no effect related to self-monitoring
was found in the previous study.
To address the concern that the value survey used in the control group inadvertently made
values salient and thus potentially biased the results in Study 1, a measure of value
salience was implemented in Study 2. The amount of time participants spent on
completing the pre- and post-manipulation value survey was recorded as a measure of
value salience. This measure of value salience was modified from the one used in Maio et
al. (2001). The rationale was that if participants in the control condition completed the
post-manipulation value survey at a similar speed as those in the value-reasoning
condition, while controlling any difference in their time spent on completing the premanipulation survey, it would suggest that values were as accessible to those in the
control condition as those in the value-reasoning condition. In addition, to address the
limitation of not having a measure of value confidence in the first study, participants in
the value-reasoning conditions and the control-value condition were asked to rate how
certain they were about their value ratings after they completed their post-manipulation
value survey. Because only participants in the value-reasoning conditions generated
concrete cognitive support to the values, it was expected that participants in the three
value-reasoning conditions would have higher value certainty than those in the controlvalue condition. The impact of the manipulation on value salience and value certainty
were not of primary interest in the current study, these effects would thus not be tested as
main hypotheses, but rather would be included in the additional analyses.

3.1

Hypotheses

The hypotheses for Study 2 were as follows:
H1. The manipulation condition will lead to differences in participants’ attitudes and
behavioral intentions: the combination condition and anti-SE condition will lead to more
positive attitudes towards the person, attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral
intentions than the pro-ST condition, which would lead to more positive responses than
the two control conditions.
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H2. The effect of manipulation condition on behavioral intention would be mediated by
attitudes towards behaviors and perceived norms regarding behaviors.
H3. Higher self-transcendence value priority will predict more positive attitudes towards
person, attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral intentions, whereas higher priority on
the self-enhancement values will be associated with more negative attitudes and
behavioral intentions.
H4. The relationship between value priorities and behavioral intentions will be mediated
by attitudes towards behaviors and perceived norms towards behaviors.

3.2
3.2.1

Method
Participants

To address the concern over the apparent inattentiveness of some MTurk participants, a
different participant pool was used. Participants were recruited from the subject pool
affiliated with the Introduction to Psychology course at Western University. Students
received class credits for participation. The project was advertised as combining, for
efficiency, two separate studies, one aimed at examining the reasoning process of
university students, and the other aimed at examining how people form first impressions
of others. The students completed the study online using Qualtrics.com.
Among the 201 participants who completed the study, 17 were excluded for spending less
than 30 seconds on the 305-word vignette (i.e. 610 words per minute) or for either not
providing any essay answer or having provided clearly off-topic essay answers during the
manipulation. The remaining 184 participants (female=113, male=71) had an average age
of 18 (SD=1.1), ranging from 17 to 28. Among these 184 participants, 162 of them
reported to speak English as their first language, while 22 of them reported that English is
not their first language.

3.2.2

Procedure

After reading the letter of information and completing the consent form, participants were
randomly assigned to one of the five experimental conditions. They were instructed to
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write for 8 minutes, providing reasons in support of the self-transcendence values (proST condition), against the self-enhancement values (anti-SE condition), in support of the
self-transcendence values relative to the self-enhancement values (combination
condition), or to simply write about their daily routine for the same amount of time
(control-value condition and control-no value condition).
For participants in the three value-reasoning conditions and in the control-value
condition, value priorities were measured once before and once after the writing task. The
amount of time that participants spent on completing each survey was recorded. These
participants were also asked to rate from 1 (“Not certain at all”) to 5 (“Very certain”) on
how certain they were about their value ratings immediately after completing the second
value survey. Participants in the control-no value condition did not complete any value
survey during the study, nor were they asked about their value certainty. All participants
were then told that they had finished the first study and would now complete a separate
second study. They then read a vignette of a person who was described as being
diagnosed with schizophrenia. The vignette was identical to the one used in Study 1, and
the person was described as a male for half of the participants and a female for the rest.
After reading the vignette, participants completed the dependent measures in the
following order: attitudes towards the person depicted in the vignette, attitudes towards
six behaviors involving this person, perceived norms towards these six behaviors, and
finally, behavioral intentions towards the person. All the measures were identical to the
ones used in Study 1.

3.2.3

Materials

All the materials used in Study 2 were identical to the ones used in Study 1 with the
exception of the instructions used in value-reasoning manipulation. The instructions used
in the value-reasoning manipulation in Study 2 can be seen in Appendix K.

3.3

Results

As previously mentioned, 17 participants were excluded from the analyses for paying
inadequate attention to the manipulation or the vignette. Including these participants did
not change the conclusions for the reported analyses except for the effect of the
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manipulation on attitudes towards behaviors, which would be discussed further in the
following section. These participants were excluded nonetheless in order to achieve
greater accuracy of estimations of the effects being tested. In addition, 13 participants
expressed their suspicion that the “two separated studies” were related, and that the
hypothesis of the study was on how personal values were related to responses to people
with mental illness. Excluding these participants slightly changed the conclusion for the
effect of the manipulation but not for other analyses, and these participants were thus
included for the analyses. The change in results with regard to the effect of the
manipulation when the suspicious participants were excluded are discussed in further
details later.
The internal consistency for the scales obtained in this study was mostly comparable to
the ones obtained in Study 1. Attitudes towards the person scale (AttP) had a Cronbach’s
Alpha of .59; the attitudes towards behavior scale (AttB) had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .92;
the social distance scale that measured participants’ behavioral intentions (BI) had a
Cronbach’s Alpha of .82; and the perceived norms scale has a Cronbach’s Alpha of .88.
See Table 5 for means and standard deviations for all the aforementioned variables and
their inter-correlations.

3.3.1

Test of Hypothesis 1: Effects of the Value-Reasoning
Manipulation

To test the effect of our manipulation on stigmatizing attitudes and behavioral intentions
towards the person described in the vignette, one-way ANOVAs were conducted on
attitudes towards the person, attitudes towards behaviors, and behavioral intentions,
respectively, with the manipulation conditions as the between-group factor. It was found
that the conditions did not have a significant effect on attitudes towards the person,
F(4,176)=2.04, p=.09, or behavioral intentions, F(4, 174)=.45, p=.77, but did have a
significant effect on attitudes towards behaviors, F(4, 174)=2.52, p=.043.
Post hoc pair-wise comparisons on AttB, corrected by Bonferroni to control for Type I
errors, showed that only the difference between the combination condition (M=3.49,
SD=.64) and the control-no value condition (M=2.95, SD=.76) reached statistical
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significance, p=.034. It is worth noting that even though the other pair-wise comparisons
did not reach statistical significance, the pattern of the differences was trending towards
the hypothesized directions (see Figure 5). In addition, for both AttP and BI, pair-wise
comparisons between different conditions were trending towards the expected pattern:
participants in the combination condition had more positive responses than participants in
other conditions, although the differences were not statistically significant. The results
were thus mixed with respect to Hypothesis 1: the combination condition tends to result
in more positive responses than other conditions, but the difference was only significant
between the combination and control-no value conditions and only for attitudes towards
behaviors. Anti-SE and pro-ST condition did not differ between themselves or when
compared to the control conditions.
It was worth noting that, when thirteen participants who expressed their suspicion that
study was to examine the relationship between personal values and responses to those
with mental illness were excluded, the effect of the manipulation condition on AttB
became only marginally significant, F(4, 163)=2.21, p=.07, even though the pattern of
the results remained unchanged. In addition, including all participants in the analysis
changed the effect of the manipulation on AttB so that the effect was no longer
significant, F(4,191)=1.78, p=.14. This change in results might suggest that those 17
participants initially excluded from the analyses were indeed inattentive during the
manipulation and therefore were not responsive to the manipulation. It might also suggest
that the effect of the manipulation on AttB, albeit trending towards the hypothesized
direction, was not a robust effect.
To further investigate whether the effects of participants’ gender and the gender of Alex
on the dependent variable found in Study 1 replicate, a Univariate ANOVA was
conducted on AttP, AttB, and BI, respectively, with the manipulation conditions,
participants’ gender, Alex’s gender as described in the vignette, and all two-way and
three-way interactions among them as the independent variables. Inconsistent with Study
1, the results showed that participants’ responses did not vary as a function of Alex’s
gender, and that no significant interaction was found among these three independent
variables on any of the three dependent variables. In addition, the effect of the
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manipulation conditions on AttB became only marginally significant, F(4, 159)=2.19,
p=.07, when participants’ gender, the gender of the person in the vignette, and their
interactions with the manipulation conditions were included as independent variables.

3.3.2

Test of Hypothesis 2: Attitudes towards Behaviors and
Perceived Norms as Mediators for the Effect of the ValueReasoning Manipulation

To test the potential mediating effects of attitudes towards behaviors and perceived norms
on the relationship between manipulation conditions and behavioral intentions, the SPSS
plug-in PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) was used, as it allows the test of direct and indirect
effects of the mediators when the predictor is a categorical variable. Through PROCESS,
the manipulation condition was entered as the predictor and the conditions were coded
using dummy coding; both attitudes towards behaviors and perceived norms were entered
as mediators, and behavioral intention was designated as the dependent variable. 1000
bootstraps were carried out to generate estimates for indirect effects. The results showed
that manipulation conditions did not have significant direct effect, B=.03, SE=.02,
t(142)=1.16, p=.25, but did have a significant indirect effect on behavioral intention
through attitudes towards behaviors (B=-.03, SE=.01, Z=-2.34, p=.02), but not through
perceived norms (B=-.02, SE=.02, Z=-.72, p=.47). Although there was a significant
indirect effect of the manipulation condition on behavioral intention through attitudes
towards behaviors, the manipulation failed to have a significant total effect on behavioral
intention, B=-.02, SE=.04, t(142)=-.60, p=.55.
The results suggested that, although the manipulation failed to have a significant direct
effect on behavioral intention, it exerted a significant indirect effect on behavioral
intention by influencing attitudes towards behavior. However, the indirect effect of the
manipulation through AttB on BI was not robust enough to lead behavioral intentions
towards Alex to vary significantly as a function of the manipulation. Overall, it seems
that Hypothesis 2 received mixed results: the manipulation did exert some influence on
behavioral intention through its impact on attitudes towards behaviors, but the effect was
not strong enough to lead to significant changes in participants’ behavioral intentions.
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3.3.3

Test of Hypothesis 3: Linking Value Priorities, Attitudes, and
Behavioral Intentions

Before testing the value-attitude-behavioral intention link, a repeated measure ANOVA
with the manipulation conditions as the between-subject variable and the pre- and postmanipulations ratings as the within-subject, repeated variable was conducted on selftranscendence values and on self-enhancement values, respectively, as in Study 1. Only
the three value-reasoning conditions and the control-value condition were included in
these analyses, as no value priority was measured for participants in the control-no value
condition. The results suggested that both participants’ self-transcendence values,
F(1,142)=5.18, p=.024, and their self-enhancement values, F(1,142)=5.76, p=.018,
significantly changed from the pre-manipulation survey to the post-manipulation survey.
Participants rated both self-transcendence values (M=0.57, SD=0.88 vs. M=0.41,
SD=0.86, p=.024) and self-enhancement values (M=-0.02, SD=0.81, vs. M=-0.18,
SD=0.79, p=.018) higher in their pre- than post-manipulation value survey. The
difference between pre- and post-manipulation ratings on self-transcendence or selfenhancement values did not vary as a function of manipulation conditions. The results
suggested that, in line with findings from Maio et al. (2001) and Study 1, thinking about
reasons for a value did not change participants’ ratings for that particular value. Rather,
participants in general rated these two values as of less importance in the postmanipulation survey. This might have been a result of differences in the specific value
items used in the two value surveys. However, such an overall decrease from pre- to postmanipulation ratings for the values was not found in Study 1. The different findings in the
two studies might have resulted from the different samples used and potential differences
in the importance assigned to the specific value items by participants in each sample, but
without further evidence, this explanation is only speculative. See Table 6 for mean and
standard deviation for each higher-order value before and after the manipulation, and the
correlations between ratings at time 1 and time 2 for each value.

To test Hypothesis 3 that the self-transcendence and self-enhancement values are
systematically related to participants’ attitudes towards Alex, attitudes towards behaviors
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with respect to Alex, and their behavioral intentions towards Alex, multiple regressions
were conducted on these variables, respectively, with either post-manipulation selftranscendence value priority or post-manipulation self-enhancement value priority
entered as the predictor. The results showed that participants’ self-reported priority on
self-transcendence values significantly predicted their attitudes towards Alex, B=.20,
SE=.07, t(143)=3.16, p=.002, their attitudes towards behaviors with respect to Alex,
B=.28, SE=.07, t(142)=3.99, p<.001, and their behavioral intentions towards Alex, B=.19,
SE=.07, t(140)=3.03, p=.005. Participants’ gender (female coded as 0; male as 1) did not
provide additional prediction to AttP, B=-.08, t(142)=-.72, p=.47, AttB, B=.11,
t(141)=.89, p=.34, or BI, B=.08, t(139)=.69, p=.50, above the prediction of selftranscendence value priority; nor did the gender of the person in the vignette (female
coded as 0; male as 1) provide any incremental prediction to AttP, B=-.03, t(142)=-.28
p=.80, AttB, B=-.03, t(141)=-.27, p=.79, or BI, B=-.09, t(139)=-.77, p=.44, above the
prediction of the value.
Self-enhancement also significantly predicted AttP, B=-.15, SE=.07, t(143)=-2.02,
p=.045, AttB, B=-.26, SE=.08, t(142)=-3.41, p=.001, and BI, B=-.21, SE=.07, t(140)=2.86, p=.005. Participants’ gender (female coded as 0; male as 1) did not provide
additional prediction to AttP, B=-.11, t(142)=-.93, p=.36, AttB, B=.10, t(141)=.77, p=.44,
or BI, B=.08, t(139)=.66, p=.51, above the prediction of self-enhancement value priority;
nor did the gender of the person in the vignette (female coded as 0; male as 1) provide
any incremental prediction to AttP, B=-.07, t(142)=-.65, p=.52, AttB, B=-.11, t(141)=.87, p=.39, or BI, B=-.15, t(139)=-1.25, p=.21, above the prediction of the value.
As can be seen from the previously reported coefficients, higher self-transcendence value
was related to more positive responses and less stigmatizing attitudes and behavioral
intentions, whereas self-enhancement value was related to less positive responses and
greater stigma. Hypothesis 3 was therefore supported.
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3.3.4

Test of Hypothesis 4: Attitudes towards Behaviors and
Perceived Norms as Mediators of the Value-Stigma Link

The potential mediational effects of attitudes towards behavior and perceived norms for
the relationship between value priorities and behavioral intention were assessed using
PROCESS. Post-manipulation ratings on the self-transcendence values was first entered
as the predictor of behavioral intention, with AttB and perceived norms entered as
mediators. 1000 bootstraps were carried out to estimate the indirect effects. The results
showed that self-transcendence value priority had no significant direct effect on
behavioral intention, B=.04, SE=.05, t(110)=.87, p=.39, however it had a significant
indirect effect on behavioral intention through attitudes towards behavior, B=.09, SE=.03,
Z=3.10, p=.002, but not through perceived norms, B=.05, SE=.04, Z=1.34, p=.18. Given
that self-transcendence value priority also had a significant total effect on behavioral
intention, B=.19, SE=.07, t(110)=2.71, p=.008, it appears that the effect of the selftranscendence value priority on participants’ behavioral intention was fully mediated by
attitudes towards behaviors. Perceived norms did not mediate the process, but rather
independently provided additional prediction to behavioral intention over and above
effect of self-transcendence values and attitudes towards behaviors, B=.44, SE=.05,
t(110)=8.44, p<.001. See Figure 6(a) for an illustration of the relationships among selftranscendence value priority, attitudes towards behaviors, perceived norms, and
behavioral intention.
The same analysis was conducted again with post-manipulation self-enhancement value
priority as the predictor. The results showed that self-enhancement value priority had no
significant direct effect on behavioral intention, B=-.09, SE=.05, t(110)=-1.74, p=.08, but
had a significant indirect effect on behavioral intention through attitudes towards
behavior, B=-.09, SE=.03, Z=-2.93, p=.003, and but not through perceived norms, B=-.08,
SE=.04, Z=-1.75, p=.08. Because self-enhancement value priority also had a significant
total effect on behavioral intention, B=-.26, SE=.08, t(110)=-3.41, p<.001, it appears that
relationship between self-enhancement value priority and behavioral intentions was fully
mediated by attitudes towards the behaviors. Rather than serving as a mediator, perceived
norms also significantly added to the prediction of behavioral intention independently of

50
self-enhancement values and attitudes towards behaviors, B=.43, SE=.05, t(110)=8.48,
p<.001. See Figure 6(b) for an illustration of the relationships among self-enhancement
value priority, attitudes towards behaviors, perceived norms, and behavioral intention.
Hypothesis 4 was therefore largely supported: attitudes towards behavioral intentions
fully mediated the relationships between self-transcendence/self-enhancement value
priorities and behavioral intentions. Perceived norms were found not to be a significant
mediator, but they did add significantly to the prediction of behavioral intention. This
finding was also consistent with results from Study 1. In both studies, attitudes towards
behaviors mediated the relationship between the self-reported priorities placed on the
self-transcendence values, and in Study 2 on the self-enhancement values, and behavioral
intentions that reflect preferred social distance with respect to Alex. Perceived norms
were found to be an independent predictor of behavioral intentions over and above the
effect of values and attitudes towards behaviors in both studies.

3.3.5

Additional Analyses on Value Salience and Value Certainty

To address the issue of whether filling out the value survey also made the values salient
for participants in the control-value condition, compared to participants in the three
value-reasoning conditions, a Univariate ANOVA on post-manipulation value salience by
conditions was conducted, with the pre-manipulation value salience entered as a
covariate. The results showed no significant difference in the amount of time spent on the
post-manipulation survey for participants in different conditions, F(3, 142)=1.74, p=.16,
when the time spent on the pre-manipulation survey was controlled for. This may suggest
that merely filling out the value survey could activate certain values for people, which
might have impacted their responses to the later tasks, and led to the non-significant
difference between the value-reasoning condition and the control-no value condition.
However, because this measure of value salience has not been validated in other studies,
the results should be interpreted with caution.
The certainty that participants assigned to their value ratings was not found to vary
significantly as a function of manipulation condition either, F(3, 143)=.83, p=.48. This
might suggest that, contrary to the postulate of Maio, Olson, Allen, et al. (2001), forming
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concrete cognitive support for a value did not influence confidence in the importance of
the value. Again, this result should be interpreted with caution because (1) the measure
was a 5-point single item question, which might not be a reliable measure of value
certainty; and (2) there is no independent evidence of the validity of this measure.

3.4

Discussion

The results from Study 2 provided only limited support for the objective of finding an
effective values based intervention to improve reactions to those with schizophrenia. In
general, it appears that the combination condition led to more positive attitudes towards
behaviors involving the person described in the vignette, but the difference was only
significant between the combination condition and the control with no value survey
condition. The combination condition did not show more effect than the anti-SE or proST condition, nor did the latter two lead to any significant difference in attitudes towards
behavior compared to the control conditions where no value-related reasoning was
completed by the participants. Moreover, the effectiveness of the combination condition
in eliciting more positive responses was not found on attitudes towards the person in the
vignette or behavioral intentions towards this person. Overall, the value-related
manipulation implemented in this study was not a robust intervention for improving
responses towards the individual with schizophrenia.
In Study 2, the expected relationships between the self-transcendence and selfenhancement value priorities and stigmatizing attitudes and behavioral intentions were
found. Greater endorsement of the self-transcendence values was related to more positive
and less stigmatizing responses towards the person described as with schizophrenia in the
vignette, whereas higher self-enhancement values were found to be related to less
positive and more stigmatizing attitudes and behavioral intentions towards this person.
These findings were consistent with the results of Study 1, and provided further support
for the notion that these two values are systematically related to mental illness stigma.
Furthermore, in Study 2, it was found that the relationship between these values and
people’s behavioral intentions was fully mediated by attitudes towards behaviors.
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Similar to the findings in Study 1, perceived norms were generally an independent
predictor of behavioral intention. This suggests that perceived norms could be an
important target in educational campaigns against mental illnesses stigma. Furthermore,
the consistent finding that perceived norms did not act as a mediator between values and
behavioral intentions might suggest that people’s perceived norms are relatively
uninfluenced by their values, and that efforts should be made to identify factors that
could influence perceived norms, and potentially be targeted in searching for effective
ways to reduce mental illness stigma.
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Chapter 4

4

General Discussion and Limitations

Two studies were conducted with the primary goal of finding an effective intervention to
reduce stigmatizing attitudes and behavioral intentions towards those with mental
illnesses. The interventions in both studies were derived from past literature showing
relationships between value priorities and preferred level of social distance towards
individuals with mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and depression (Norman,
Sorrentino, Gawronski, et al., 2010) and the effectiveness of values based reasoning tasks
in increasing the likelihood that people will act in a fashion that is consistent with their
values (Maio, Olson, Allen, et al., 2001).
The value-based manipulation implemented in Study 1, which asked participants to
consider reasons either supportive or contrary to self-transcendence value or selfenhancement value, did not effectively lead to differences in subsequent attitudes and
behavioral intentions towards a hypothetical person described as being diagnosed with
schizophrenia. Based on exploratory analyses, modifications were made on the valuerelated manipulation so that participants only considered reasons either in support of selftranscendence value or against self-enhancement value in Study 2. A third manipulation
condition was also added, in which participants considered reasons for why acting on the
basis of self-transcendence values was better than actions based on self-enhancement
value (i.e., combination condition). Partly consistent with the hypothesis, the combination
condition was found to generate the most positive attitudes towards behaviors involving
the person described in the vignette. However, only the contrast between the combination
condition and the control with no value condition was statistically significant. There were
no comparable effects on attitudes towards the person or behavioral intentions.
Even though the manipulations used in the current studies did not show robust effects in
reducing stigma, it could still be interesting and informative to consider why the
combination condition in Study 2 might have elicited the most positive attitudes towards
behaviors compared to all other conditions. The proposed explanation for the greater
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effectiveness of the combination condition was that by contrasting the self-transcendence
values against the self-enhancement values, it made it more explicit to people that actions
pursuing the self-enhancement values can be in conflict with the pursuit of selftranscendence values, thereby making people more aware of the potential trade-off
between cost and benefits associated with actions consistent with self-transcendence
values. As a result, people would have better cognitive support for behaving consistently
with self-transcendence values, even when there is some cost of not pursuing the
competing self-enhancement values. This explanation is in agreement with the postulate
that values often act as truisms (Maio & Olson, 1998) and that both a value and its
cognitive support need to be activated in order to facilitate corresponding attitudes and
behaviors. Findings from Study 2 might contribute to the existing value literature by
highlighting the importance of considering potentially competing values involved in any
situation, and the importance of making the competing nature of some values explicit to
people in order to promote value-consistent attitudes and behaviors.
More evidence is needed to confidently conclude that such an effect does exist and that
the findings from Study 2 are replicable. Furthermore, the proposed underlying
mechanism for the effect is currently no more than speculation. Measures designed to
assess value salience and value certainty were not influenced by the value-reasoning
manipulation implemented in Study 2. Further research is needed to understand the route
through which making the contrast between self-transcendence and self-enhancement
values more explicit might lead to attitudes more consistent with self-transcendence
values and less stigmatization towards those with serious mental illness.
The technique of arguing why actions consistent with self-transcendence values are more
important than those consistent with self-enhancement values is, interestingly, somewhat
comparable to Rokeach’s self-confrontation technique (Rokeach, 1971). Both these two
techniques aimed at changing people’s attitudes and behaviors by contrasting one value
with another. The main difference between these two techniques is that one is aimed at
forming reasons in support of a value against the other, whereas the other is aimed at
inducing self-dissatisfaction through social comparisons. One interesting and potentially
informative line of future research would be to examine whether Rokeach’s self-
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confrontation technique could be applied in the context of mental illness stigma, and to
compare it with the effect of developing cognitive support for pursuing one value at the
cost of pursuing another. These two techniques could even be combined in creating a
novel intervention in which people both are induced to feel self-dissatisfaction through
social comparison, and are invited to form cognitive support for pursuing one value over
the other. Examining the effectiveness of these different techniques could potentially
provide valuable insights for the development of an effective intervention in reducing
stigma against serious mental illness.
It is important to note that, in Study 2, the effect of the manipulation on attitudes towards
behavior did not translate to any significant effect on behavioral intention. Such a lack of
correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intention could result from situational
factors that discouraged people from endorsing actions consistent with their attitudes.
Following the model depicted in Figure 3, the perception of behavioral control, or lack
thereof, could also modulate the effect of the manipulation on behavioral intention. It is
possible that some situational factors decreased participants’ expectation that their
behavior would actually accomplish goals promoted by their self-transcendence values.
For example, a lack of familiarity with people with schizophrenia might have made
participants unsure about how to act appropriately when engaging in the behaviors
included in the measure of social distance. Future research could probe into factors
related to the perceived control component outlined in the model, and examine the
potential effect of interventions based on these factors. For example, educational
programs could give people instructions on what the appropriate behaviors are during
social interactions with those with mental illnesses. Being informed of how to behave
appropriately in such social interactions, people may be more confident in how they
should act and perceive greater control over their behaviors, which could potentially lead
to greater consistency between their attitudes towards the behaviors and behavioral
intentions.
The more consistent findings across the two studies were the relationship between
priorities placed on self-transcendence and self-enhancement values and stigmatizing
attitudes and behaviors. Participants’ attitudes towards the person in vignette, attitudes
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towards behaviors involving the person, and intentions to engage in behaviors with
respect to this person were all positively related to their self-transcendence value priority,
and negatively related to their self-enhancement value priority. In other words, people
with higher self-transcendence values would form more positive evaluations towards the
person described as with schizophrenia in the vignette, and would show greater intentions
to engage in social interactions with this person. People with higher self-enhancement
value, in contrast, have less positive evaluations towards this person and are less willing
to engage in social interactions with this person. These findings are consistent with
previous findings on values and mental illnesses stigma (e.g., Norman et al., 2008).
In addition, Study 2 found a full mediation by attitudes towards behaviors for the
relationship between value priority and behavioral intention. This finding concerning the
significant mediational role of attitudes towards behaviors could contribute to the extant
research by providing first evidence in support of the value-attitude-behavior hierarchical
structure (Homer & Kahle, 1988) as applied to the issue of mental illness stigma. In
addition, the findings fit with the model described in the introduction and illustrated in
Figure 3, which stemmed from an integration of the theory of planned behavior and the
value-expectancy model by Feather (1991). It is, however, worth noting that this
mediational path was not found consistently cross the two studies. This inconsistency
requires further investigation and poses a major limitation for the current studies.
Furthermore, no competing model was tested in the current studies, and there could be
alternative models that could also explain the patterns emerged in the data. More
evidence is needed to further reveal the mechanisms underlying the relationship between
values and behavioral intentions towards those with mental illness, and the extent to
which attitudes towards these behaviors indeed mediate the process.
As previously mentioned, it was consistently found across the two studies that perceived
norms provided additional and significant prediction to behavioral intention beyond the
prediction of values and attitudes towards behaviors. Even though past research has
looked at how perceived norms, attitudes, and values influence mental illness stigma,
little has been done to examine the relationship amongst these variables and how they
jointly exert impact on stigma. The current studies contribute to the extant literature by
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providing preliminary evidence of how these factors are related to each other in
determining people’s behavioral intentions towards those with mental illnesses.
Finally, the two samples used in Study 1 and 2 were very different: the first sample was
recruited on MTurk and was a more mature and diverse sample than the second one,
which mainly consisted of first year university students. More people were excluded from
the first sample for giving obviously irrelevant answers during the writing task of the
manipulation compared to the second sample. This might indicate some difference in the
quality of responses attained from the two samples. Such differences between the two
samples might have contributed to some of the inconsistent findings in Study 1 and 2, and
future attempts should be made to test the hypotheses again using more comparable
samples.
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Table 1
Summary of Inter-correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Dependent
Variables in Study 1
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

1. AttP

-

.63**

.58**

.53**

-.08

2. AttB

.63**

-

.68**

.65**

-.04

3. BI

.58**

.68**

-

.74**

.03

4. Norms

.53**

.65**

.74**

-

.12

5. Monitoring

-.08

-.04

.03

.12

-

M

4.18

3.39

2.70

3.56

1.44

SD

1.04

1.10

0.82

0.96

0.21

Note. AttP= Attitudes towards the Person; AttB= Attitudes towards Behaviors; BI=
Behavioral Intentions; Norms= Perceived Norms; Monitoring= Self-Monitoring. **p<.01.
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Table 2
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Each Higher-Order Value Before and
After the Manipulation, and Correlation between the Rating at Time 1 and at Time 2 For
Each Value in Study 1
Pre-Manipulation

Post-Manipulation

M(SD)

M(SD)

T1-T2 Correlation

Openness to Change

0.08(0.82)

0.21(0.94)

.58**

Conservation

-0.25(0.91)

-0.45(1.14)

.58**

Self-Enhancement

-0.62(0.96)

-0.62(0.96)

.64**

Self-Transcendence

0.80(0.92)

0.85(0.89)

.60**

Value

Note. **p<.01.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of the Three Dependent Variables for Participants with
Different Argument Directions
Argument Direction Groups
Pro-ST
M

SD

Both-ST
M

SD

Pro-SE
M

SD

Anti-SE

Both-SE

M

M

SD

SD

AttP

4.18ab 1.00

3.18a

1.07

4.31ab 1.00

4.87b

.74

4.04ab 1.07

AttB

3.33ab 1.06

2.21a

.92

3.74ab 1.00

4.42b

.37

3.34ab 1.09

BI

2.65a

2.12a

.66

2.61a

3.81b

.39

2.59a

.73

.91

.62

Note. Means followed by the same subscript do not differ at 5% level of significance.
Pro-ST= Participants who argued only in favor of self-transcendence value; Both-ST=
Participants argued both in favor and against self-transcendence value; Pro-SE=
Participants who argued only in favor of self-enhancement value; Anti-SE= Participants
argued only against self-enhancement value; Both-SE= Participants argued both in favor
and against self-enhancement value; AttP=Attitudes towards the person in vignette
(Alex); AttB= Attitudes towards behaviors involving Alex; BI= Behavioral intentions
towards Alex.
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Manipulation Ratings on Self-Transcendence
Values and Self-Enhancement Values for Participants with Different Argument
Directions
Argument Direction Group
Pro-ST
M

SD

Both-ST
M

Pro-SE

Anti-SE

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Both-SE
M

SD

ST

0.94b

0.63

0.92ab

0.61

0.08a

0.87

1.31b

0.76 0.77ab

1.09

SE

-0.67ab

0.82

-0.47ab

0.96

0.34a

0.98

-1.59b

1.05 -0.76ab 0.92

Note. Means followed by the same subscript do not differ at 5% level of significance. ST
= self-transcendence values; SE= self-enhancement values. Pro-ST= Participants who
argued only in favor of self-transcendence values; Both-ST= Participants argued both in
favor and against self-transcendence values; Pro-SE= Participants who argued only in
favor of self-enhancement values; Anti-SE= Participants argued only against selfenhancement values; Both-SE= Participants argued both in favor and against selfenhancement values.
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Table 5
Summary of Inter-Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Dependent
Variables in Study 2
Variable

1

2

3

4

1. AttP

-

.50**

.47**

.35**

2. AttB

.50**

-

.65**

.49**

3. BI

.47**

.65**

-

.75**

4. Norms

.35**

.49**

.75**

-

M

3.97

3.26

2.77

3.60

SD

0.71

0.77

0.70

0.83

Note. AttP= Attitudes towards the Person; AttB= Attitudes towards Behaviors; BI=
Behavioral Intentions; Norms= Perceived Norms; Monitoring= Self-Monitoring. **p<.01.
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Table 6
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Each Higher-Order Value Before and
After the Manipulation, and Correlation between the Rating at Time 1 and at Time 2 For
Each Value in Study 2
Pre-Manipulation

Post-Manipulation

M(SD)

M(SD)

T1-T2 Correlation

Openness to Change

0.23(0.79)

0.48(0.81)

.46**

Conservation

-0.78(0.76)

-0.71(0.83)

.45**

Self-Enhancement

-0.02(0.81)

-0.18(0.79)

.52**

Self-Transcendence

0.57(0.82)

0.41(0.85)

.52**

Value

Note. **p<.01.
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Figure 1. Schwartz’s (1992) value structure.
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Figure 2. The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991).

75

Figure 3. The value-attitude-behavior hierarchy: integrating the theory of planned
behavior and Feather’s expectancy value model.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 4. The mediating effects of attitudes towards behavior and perceived norms for
the relationship between the self-transcendence (a) and the self-enhancement (b) value
priorities and behavioral intentions in Study 1.
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Figure 5. Attitudes towards behaviors varied significantly as a function of manipulation
condition in Study 2.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 6. The mediating effects of attitudes towards behavior and perceived norms for
the relationship between the self-transcendence (a) and the self-enhancement (b) value
priorities and behavioral intentions in Study 2.
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Appendix C: Value Surveys
Pre-manipulation Value Survey
In this questionnaire you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME as guiding
principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?" There are two lists of
values on the following pages. These values come from different cultures. In the
parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its
meaning.
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in your life.
Use the rating scale below:
0--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3--means the value is important.
6--means the value is very important.
The higher the number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), the more important the value is as a guiding
principle in YOUR life.
-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life;
ordinarily
there are no more than two such values.
In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the
importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible
between the values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers
more than once.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:
opposed
to my
values
-1

not
important
0
1

2

important
3

4

5

very
important
6

of
supreme
importance
7

Before you begin, read the values in the list, choose the one that is most important to you
and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and
rate it -1. If there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 or
1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values in the list.
____AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)
AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)
____HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
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POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
____SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
____A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
____RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honored customs)
____SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)
____A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change)
INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & action)
____LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)
____SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
____CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)
Post-manipulation Value Survey
In this questionnaire you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME as guiding
principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?" There are two lists of
values on the following pages. These values come from different cultures. In the
parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its
meaning.
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in your life.
Use the rating scale below:
0--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3--means the value is important.
6--means the value is very important.
The higher the number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), the more important the value is as a guiding
principle in YOUR life.
-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life;
ordinarily
there are no more than two such values.
In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the
importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible
between the values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers
more than once.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:
opposed
to my
values
-1

not
important
0

1

2

important
3
4

5

very
important
6

of
supreme
importance
7
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Before you begin, read the values in the list, choose the one that is most important to you
and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and
rate it -1. If there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 or
1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values in the list
SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
____BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
____DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
____INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)
____HONORING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
____CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
____CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
____HONEST (genuine, sincere)
____OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)
____ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)
____DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief)
____FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
WEALTH (material possessions, money)
____CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)
____AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)
____SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
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Appendix D: Value-Reasoning Manipulation Instructions for Study One
Instruction for Self-Enhancement condition
We would like you to think about reasons that, in general, could be used to support or
oppose the importance of looking out for one's own interests and achieving personal
success relative to other people. Such success could include, but not limit to, wealth,
social prestige and power, etc. For example, you might believe that people should view
achieving personal success as a primary goal in their life because such success proves
their strong abilities and their valuable contributions to society, for which society
provides them with rewards such as money and status in return. In contrast, you might
believe that people should not focus too much on personal success because such success
does not necessarily bring happiness and inner satisfaction. If you would like, you can
write reasons that support AND reasons that oppose the importance of pursuing personal
success; or you can choose to write from only one side of the argument.
We would like you to explain as clearly as possible how each of your reasons supports or
opposes the importance of personal success. Try to organize your thoughts before you
write.
Instruction for Self-transcendence condition
We would like you to think about reasons that, in general, could be used to support or
oppose the importance of being concerned for the welfare of others. Such concern could
be demonstrated when people are being helpful to other people, showing tolerance for
those who are different from themselves, and caring for animals and nature. For example,
you might believe that people should care about others because human beings are social
animals, and that caring for others can be psychologically rewarding for ourselves. In
contrast, you might believe that people are in charge of their own lives, and that we
should be responsible for and only for our own lives and should not interfere with how
other people live their lives. If you would like, you can write reasons that support AND
reasons that oppose the importance of concern for others’ welfare; or you can choose to
write from only one side of the argument.
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We would like you to explain as clearly as possible how each of your reasons supports or
opposes the importance of being concerned about the welfare of others. Try to organize
your thoughts before you write.
Instruction for Control condition
We would like you to think about what an ordinary day would be like for you. Please
describe what you would usually do in a typical day. For example, you can write about
what you usually do in the morning, afternoon, and at night. You can also write about
particular tasks you enjoy or do not enjoy in a typical day (e.g. doing sports, writing
essays, etc.) and why you enjoy them or not.
We would like you to explain as clearly as possible what you daily routine would be like.
Try to organize your thoughts before you write.
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Appendix E: Vignette of a Person with Schizophrenia
Female Version
Starting a couple of months ago, Alex changed in her nature. More and more she
retreated from her friends and colleagues, up to the point of avoiding them. If someone
managed to involve her in a conversation, she would only talk about whether some
people have the natural gift of reading other people’s thoughts. This question has become
her sole concern. In contrast with her previous habits, she stopped taking care of her
appearance and looks increasingly untidy. At work, Alex seemed absent-minded and
frequently made mistakes. As a consequence, she was summoned to her boss.
Finally, Alex stayed away from work for an entire week without an excuse. Upon her
return, she seemed anxious and harassed. She reported that she was absolutely certain
that people not only can read other people’s thoughts, but that they can also directly
influence them. She was, however, unsure who would steer her thoughts. She also said
that, when thinking, she was continually interrupted. Frequently she would even hear
those people talk to her, and they would give her instructions. Sometimes, they would
also talk to each other and make fun of whatever she was doing at the time. She said that
the situation was particularly bad at her apartment. At home she felt threatened and was
terribly scared. Hence, she did not spent the night at her place for a week, but rather she
hid in hotel rooms and hardly dared to go out. Alex sought professional help and was told
she appears to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Upon being diagnosed a few weeks ago, Alex has started taking medications prescribed
by her doctor. She has shown gradual improvement, although she still experiences odd
thoughts and hears strange things occasionally. She is trying hard to keep her life
balanced by taking her medications and hopes to eventually get back to her job.
Male Version
Starting a couple of months ago, Alex has changed in his nature. More and more he
retreated from his friends and colleagues, up to the point of avoiding them. If someone
manages to involve him in a conversation, he would only talk about whether some people
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have the natural gift of reading other people’s thoughts. This question has become his
sole concern. In contrast with his previous habits, he stopped taking care of his
appearance and looks increasingly untidy. At work, Alex seemed absent-minded and
frequently made mistakes. As a consequence, he was summoned to his boss.
Finally, Alex stayed away from work for an entire week without an excuse. Upon his
return, he seemed anxious and harassed. He reported that he was absolutely certain that
people not only can read other people’s thoughts, but that they can also directly influence
them. He was, however, unsure who would steer his thoughts. He also said that, when
thinking, he was continually interrupted. Frequently he would even hear those people talk
to him, and they would give his instructions. Sometimes, they would also talk to each
other and make fun of whatever he was doing at the time. He said that the situation was
particularly bad at his apartment. At home he felt threatened and was terribly scared.
Hence, he did not spend the night at his place for a week, but rather he hid in hotel rooms
and hardly dared to go out. Alex sought professional help and was told he appears to be
suffering from schizophrenia.
Upon being diagnosed a few weeks ago, Alex has started taking medications prescribed
by his doctor. With the help of his doctor and families, he has shown graduate
improvement, although he still experiences odd thoughts and hears strange things
occasionally. He is trying hard to keep his life balanced by taking his medications and
hopes to eventually get back to his job.
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Appendix F: Attitudes towards Person Scale
Given the description, please rate Alex as best you can, on each of the following
dimensions. We realize that these can be very difficult judgments to make. Indicate your
rating by placing an X on the most appropriate space of each scale:

I would think Alex is:
________
1
Very
Pleasant

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant

________
1
Very
Good

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Bad

________
1
Very
Nasty

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Nice

________ ________
1
2
Very
Unattractive

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Attractive

________ ________
1
2
Very
Dangerous

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Safe
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Appendix G: Attitudes towards Behaviors Scale
Please indicate your feelings towards each one of the following six possible interactions
with Alex by choosing the appropriate number for each item.
1. Going to a party at Alex’s house would be:
________
1
Very
Pleasant
________
1
Very
Good
________
1
Very
Nasty
________
1
Very
Unattractive
________
1
Very
Dangerous

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant
________
7
Very
Bad
________
7
Very
Nice
________
7
Very
Attractive
________
7
Very
Safe

2. Doing schoolwork with Alex would be:
________
1
Very
Pleasant
________
1
Very
Good
________
1
Very
Nasty
________
1

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant
________
7
Very
Bad
________
7
Very
Nice
________
7
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Very
Unattractive
_______ ________
1
2
Very
Dangerous

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

Very
Attractive
________
7
Very
Safe

3. Having lunch with Alex would be:
________
1
Very
Pleasant
________
1
Very
Good
________
1
Very
Nasty
________
1
Very
Unattractive
________
1
Very
Dangerous

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant
________
7
Very
Bad
________
7
Very
Nice
________
7
Very
Attractive
________
7
Very
Safe

4. Trusting Alex to take care of your child would be:
________
1
Very
Pleasant
________
1
Very
Good

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
1

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant
________
7
Very
Bad

________
7
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Very
Nasty
________ ________
1
2
Very
Unattractive
________ ________
1
2
Very
Dangerous

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

Very
Nice
________
7
Very
Attractive
________
7
Very
Safe

5. Supporting your sibling or child to marry Alex would be:
________
1
Very
Pleasant
________
1
Very
Good
________
1
Very
Nasty
________
1
Very
Unattractive
________
1
Very
Dangerous

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant
________
7
Very
Bad
________
7
Very
Nice
________
7
Very
Attractive
________
7
Very
Safe

6. Recommending Alex for a job would be:
________
1
Very
Pleasant
________
1
Very
Good

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
2

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Unpleasant
________
7
Very
Bad
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________ ________
1
2
Very
Nasty
________ ________
1
2
Very
Unattractive
________ ________
1
2
Very
Dangerous

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
3

________
4

________
5

________
6

________
7
Very
Nice
________
7
Very
Attractive
________
7
Very
Safe
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Appendix H: Perceived Norms Scale
Please answer the following questions regarding how you feel or how others would react:

1a. I would feel I have a personal or moral obligation such that I really ought to be
willing to go to a party at Alex’s house:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
No
Strong
Obligation
Obligation
At All
1b. How likely is it that people who are close to you (family and friends) would
themselves go to a party at Alex’s house?
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
They
They
Certainly
Certainly
Would
Would Not
1c. If I go to a party at Alex’s house people who are important to me would:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very
Strongly
Approve

________
7
Very
Strongly
Disapprove

2a. I would feel I have a personal or moral obligation such that I really ought to be
willing to do schoolwork with Alex:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
No
Strong
Obligation
Obligation
At All
2b. How likely is it that people who are close to you (family and friends) would
themselves do schoolwork with Alex?
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
They
They
Certainly
Certainly
Would
Would Not
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2c. If I do schoolwork with Alex people who are important to me would:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very
Strongly
Approve

________
7
Very
Strongly
Disapprove

3a. I would feel I have a personal or moral obligation such that I really ought to be
willing to have lunch with Alex:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
No
Strong
Obligation
Obligation
At All
3b. How likely is it that people who are close to you (family and friends) would
themselves have lunch with Alex?
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
They
They
Certainly
Certainly
Would
Would Not
3c. If I have lunch with Alex people who are important to me would:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very
Strongly
Approve

________
7
Very
Strongly
Disapprove

4a. I would feel I have a personal or moral obligation such that I really ought to be
willing to trust Alex to take care of my child:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
No
Strong
Obligation
Obligation
At All
4b. How likely is it that people who are close to you (family and friends) would
themselves trust Alex to take care of their children?
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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They
Certainly
Would

They
Certainly
Would Not

4c. If I trust Alex to take care of my child people who are important to me would:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
Very
Strongly
Strongly
Approve
Disapprove

5a. I would feel I have a personal or moral obligation such that I really ought to be
willing to support my sibling or child to marry Alex:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
No
Strong
Obligation
Obligation
At All
5b. How likely is it that people who are close to you (family and friends) would
themselves support their sibling or child to marry Alex?
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
They
They
Certainly
Certainly
Would
Would Not
5c. If I support my sibling or child to marry Alex people who are important to me would:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
Very
Strongly
Strongly
Approve
Disapprove

6a. I would feel I have a personal or moral obligation such that I really ought to be
willing to recommend Alex for a job:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
No
Strong
Obligation
Obligation
At All
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6b. How likely is it that people who are close to you (family and friends) would
themselves recommend Alex for a job?
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
They
They
Certainly
Certainly
Would
Would Not
6c. If I recommend Alex for a job people who are important to me would:
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very
Strongly
Approve

________
7
Very
Strongly
Disapprove
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Appendix I: Self-Monitoring Scale
In the following list, if a statement is true or mostly true as it applies to you, click on T.
If a statement is false or not usually true as it applies to you, click F.
T F 1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
T F 2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like.
T F 3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
T F 4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information.
T F 5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
T F 6. I would probably make a good actor.
T F 7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
T F 8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different
persons.
T F 9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
T F 10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
T F 11. I would not change my opinions or the way I do things in order to please
someone or win their favor.
T F 12. I have considered being an entertainer.
T F 13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
T F 14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different
situations.
T F 15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
T F 16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
T F 17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right
end).
T F 18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
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Appendix J: Behavioral Intention (Social Distance) Scale

Please indicate how likely is it that you would do each of the following with respect to
Alex? (Please click one item on the scale for each question):
1. Go to a party at Alex’s house?
1
2
I certainly would
I probably would

3
I might

4
I probably would not

5
I certainly
would not

2. Have lunch with Alex?
1
2
I certainly would
I probably would

3
I might

4
I probably would not

5
I certainly
would not

3. Do schoolwork with Alex?
1
2
I certainly would
I probably would

3
I might

4
I probably would not

5
I certainly
would not

4. Trust Alex to take care of your child?
1
2
I certainly would
I probably would

3
I might

4
I probably would not

5
I certainly
would not

5. Be willing to support having your sibling or child marry Alex?
1
2
3
4
I certainly would
I probably would
I might
I probably would not

6. Recommend Alex for a job?
1
2
I certainly would
I probably would

3
I might

4
I probably would not

5
I certainly
would not

5
I certainly
would not
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Appendix K: Value-Reasoning Manipulation Instruction for Study Two
Instruction for Pro-ST Condition
We are collecting reasons as to why or why not university students might consider it as
important to be concerned for the welfare of others. Such concern could be demonstrated
when people are being helpful to other people, showing tolerance for those who are
different from themselves, and caring for animals and nature.
If you are willing, could you please tell us why you might think that it IS important to be
concerned about other people’s welfare?
Instruction for Anti-SE Condition
We are collecting reasons as to why or why not university students might consider it as
important to look out for their own interests and achieve personal success relative to other
people. Such success could include, but not limit to, wealth, social prestige and power,
etc.
If you are willing, could you please tell us why you might think it IS NOT important to
achieve personal success relative to other people?
Instruction for Combination Condition
Some university students might consider it as important to be concerned for the welfare
of others. Such concern could be demonstrated when people are being helpful to other
people, showing tolerance for those who are different from themselves, and caring for
animals and nature. Others students might consider it as important to look out for their
own interests and achieve personal success relative to other people. Such success could
include, but not limit to, wealth, social prestige and power, etc.
We are collecting reasons as to why or why not students might consider being concerned
about the welfare of others as more important than looking out for one’s own interests
and achieving personal success relative to others.
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If you are willing, could you please tell us why you might think it as more important to
be concerned about others’ welfare than to achieve one’s personal success relative to
others?
Instruction for Control-Value and Control-No Value Conditions
We would like you to think about what an ordinary day would be like for you. Please
describe what you would usually do in a typical day. For example, you can write about
what you usually do in the morning, afternoon, and at night. You can also write about
particular tasks you enjoy or do not enjoy in a typical day (e.g. doing sports, writing
essays, etc.) and why you enjoy them or not.
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